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ABSTRACT
In China, state governance in corporations serves the purpose of Communist party control 
over the political, social, and economic development and most importantly, stability of the 
country. Therefore, Chinese state owned firms have equally important corporate and social 
objectives. Both objectives must be controlled and managed well through the corporate sector in 
order for China to successfully advance its economy and preserve its political order. While the 
state governance relationship with performance of Chinese corporations is well studied, the state 
relationship with employment has little literature. Therefore, we propose that state governance 
will have effects on firm performance and employment. This study examines these relationships 
by panel regressions for a large sample of 2,536 Chinese publicly listed firms during 2001-2011.
The results affirm a non-linear, concave relationship between state ownership and 
financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. This relationship suggests private-governed 
and highly-state-govemed firms have lower performance than mixed governed firms. Second, 
the results strongly indicate that state governance positively affects employment stability and 
number of employees. These results support the hypothesis that high employment is an objective 
of Chinese firms. After standardizing the dependent variable as the number of employees over 
assets, mixed control firms provide the least benefit in social performance. This finding is the 
opposite to their market performance. The mixed control firms perform poorly because they are 
more focused on financial performance. Moreover, they may not receive effective governance 
monitoring as neither private nor state firms has enough ownership to attend to social 
performance, and they face more ambiguity and conflict between firms and state objectives of 
profit maximization versus social maximization.
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Chapter I 
Introduction and Background
1.1 Introduction
As a role of world factory, the low labour costs in China affect all types of industries. Has 
the Chinese evolution of state owned enterprises always been about economic development that 
included both corporate and social objectives? Is that a grabbing hand or helping hand with 
performance of both corporate and social objectives (including social stability and job creation)?
In China, state governance in corporations serves the purpose of Communist party control 
over the political, social, and economic development and most importantly, stability of the 
country. Therefore, Chinese state owned enterprises have equally important corporate and social 
objectives. The first objective is market performance. The second objective is employment. Both 
objectives must be controlled and managed well through the corporate sector in order for China 
to successfully advance its economy and preserve its political order. While the state governance 
relationship with performance of Chinese corporations is well studied, the state relationship with 
employment has little literature. This study hypothesizes that state governance will have effects 
on both market and social performance. The relationships are examined by using panel 
regressions for a large sample of 2,536 Chinese publicly listed firms during 2001-2011.
Putterman and Dong (2000) argue that the general characterization of China’s state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) are over-manned vehicles of artificial employment creation is 
seriously misleading. In fact, China’s industrialization strategy in the performance era was 
capital intensive in character, and employment creation lagged far behind growth of the 
industrial sector in other respects. What would happen if SOEs cut employment costs to increase 
their net income and other financial performance? Wang (2005) suggests that it may be more
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pertinent for China to promote good corporate governance practices to reduce possible adverse 
effects of public listings than to dispose the existing approach of reforming SOEs.
Xia Gang of SOEs is a major event that happened after 1997. Xia Gang is a new form of 
unemployment which means workers lose the position in SOEs but still have to keep their 
registration with their employer. The workers only keep the work permit or registration with 
their employer but do not go to work or get paid any salary. If the worker decided to cancel or 
transfer their registration, they will lose their pension and all types of compensation. (Wang, 
2003) Also, many SOEs did not pay out the pension and compensation on time. The concept is 
to reduce redundant positions in SOEs and decrease the costs. Government also encourages these 
people to start their own business. However, the age of most people who got laid-off because of 
Xia Gang are in their forties. They had no other skills since they worked for their employers in 
factories for more than 20 years. Other reforms that occurred at this time are involved medical, 
education, and housing issues. Xia Gang is an example of the social welfare role of SOEs, as the 
Chinese government can control SOEs and their impact on social performance to the public.
1.2 Background of reforming China’s state-owned enterprises
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the government nationalized 
the private sector industrial economy and took control of state-owned companies. Two categories 
of ownership were created along the Soviet model: ownership by the state and ownership by the 
people (often called collective ownership). State-owned enterprises in China are enterprises that 
are majority, or wholly owned by the government. The government can be either the central or 
provincial government. (Naughton, 1995)
SOEs play an important role in the Chinese economy for both financial and social 
benefits. By 1958, the state sector accounted for 89.17% of the industrial output, up from 32.69% 
in 1949 (Sun, 2005). “SOEs used to be the most important part of the economy, accounting for
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90% of the output in 1980 and employing the majority of the urban work force.” However, since 
the reform in the 1980s, the outputs of SOEs have declined dramatically, and “in 2003, the 
output of SOEs only contributed less than one-third of the total output.” (Wang, 2003)
Before the reform China was under the regime of a planned economy. SOEs were 
directly controlled and managed by governments with little corporate discretion over their 
business operations. Production, purchases, sales and wage rates were all decided by the 
government. All the labour and raw materials used in production were allocated by the 
government. Management had the power to decide what to produce or what prices their products 
should be. “The consequence of such a system was the stagnation of industrial production and 
the shortage of industrial products.” (Wang, 2003)
The economic reform of SOEs in China started in 1978 primarily at the provincial level. 
The more systematic reform of China’s SOEs accelerated in the mid-1980s, and its process can 
be divided into three stages according to the study by Wang (2003). Please see Appendix One 
for details of the reform.
1.3 Role of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
“With this burden of multiple and sometimes conflicting tasks, the economic 
performance of the state-owned sector was extremely poor. Many SOEs just survived on the 
government’s protection and subsidies, e.g. cheap raw materials and low interest loans from the 
state banks, among which a large percentage became non-performing eventually.” (Sun, 2005) 
Since the 1950s, employment by the state played an important role in the organization of 
urban life. “As has been much remarked elsewhere, work units occupied center stage in the 
economic and social lives of workers by providing not only wages but also subsidized housing, 
education, health care, and retirement pensions.” (Putterman and Dong, 2000) Moreover, SOEs
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are assigned production and profit targets set by the government. In addition, SOEs were to 
provide job opportunities and undertake social welfare functions for their employees.
Government and Communist party exercised political control through the work units, and 
the party enforced what can be described as an unwritten social compact between itself and 
workers. Government gained control of the state from a base in the countryside as presented in 
Mao’s famous theory; the party had subsequently committed itself to building support in the 
cities by means of a comprehensive urban welfare scheme. The growth of SOEs facilitated 
meeting the government promise to maintain customary urban living standards, improve the 
health care, urban services, and other forms of employment-based social insurance. Thus, in the 
matter of welfare, government policy displayed a clear urban bias (Zweig, 1990), but rather than 
setting up a comprehensive public welfare system to help implement the social compact, income 
and other guarantees were provided through the work units. The role of SOEs in this 
arrangement would place a critical constraint on the first decade and a half of market-oriented 
economic reforms.
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Chapter II 
Literature Review
2.1 Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure
The agency problem is an essential element of the contractual view of the firm, and it is 
developed by Coase (1937) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). The importance of the agency 
problem is the separation of management and finance, in other words, ownership and control. 
Generally, the shareholders and manager sign a contract that specifies what the manager does 
with the investment capital, and how the returns would be divided between him and the 
corporation. Ideally, they would sign a complete contract, which specifies exactly what the 
manager does in all states of the world, and how the profits are allocated. However, most future 
contingencies are hard to describe and foresee, and this causes the contracts to become infeasible. 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)
Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their famous paper which integrated elements 
from the theory of agency, containing the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to 
develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. The firm is a “black box” operated so as 
to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, and to maximize 
profits, or present value. There is no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the 
individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. More recently, 
popular and professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation 
of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” 
have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicated that if a wholly-owned firm is managed by the 
owner, he will make operating decisions that maximize his utility. These decisions will involve 
not only the benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various
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non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments of the 
office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the kind and amount 
of charitable contributions, personal relation with employees, a larger than optimal computer to 
play with, or purchase of production inputs from friends. The optimum mix of the various 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is achieved when the marginal utility derived from an 
additional dollar of expenditure is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal 
utility derived from an additional dollar.
As the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes 
falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources 
in the form of perquisites. This also makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend 
more resources in monitoring his behaviour. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner of obtaining 
additional cash in the equity markets rise as his fractional ownership falls. We shall continue to 
characterize the agency conflict between the owner-manager and shareholders, who have their 
shares proportionately in the profits of the firm and have limited liability, as deriving from the 
manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own 
consumption. However, we do not mean to leave the impression that this is the only or even the 
most important source of conflict. Indeed, it is likely that the most important conflict arises from 
the fact that as the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to 
creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such 
ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to manage or to learn 
about new technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them 
also represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and it can result in the value of the firm being 
substantially lower than it otherwise could be (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Zhan and Turner 
(2012) also state that minority shareholders in Chinese listed firms place a higher value on firms
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where the controlling shareholder is a local government, but do not do so when the controlling 
shareholder is the central government.
“The publicly held business corporation is an awesome social invention. Millions of 
individuals voluntarily entrust billions of dollars, francs, pesos, etc. of personal wealth to the care 
of managers on the basis of a complex set of contracting relationships which delineate the rights 
of the parties involved. The growth in the use of the corporate form as well as the growth in 
market value of established corporations suggests that at least, up to the present, creditors and 
investors have by and large not been disappointed with the results, despite the agency costs 
inherent in the corporate form” Central to this analysis is the agency theory that explains the 
conflict of interest between inside corporate decision makers and outside shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Most studies since Jensen and Meckling (1976) have focused on firms 
located in the U.S. or a few developed countries. The existing empirical evidence on this subject 
is far from conclusive and at times the results are conflicting.
2.2 Political economy theory - grabbing hand
Economists traditionally view public enterprises as curing market failures. Public 
enterprises are controlled by governments maximizing social welfare, and improve on the 
decisions of private enterprises when monopoly power or externalities introduce divergence 
between private and social objectives. Public enterprises are productively efficient, and charge 
prices that more accurately reflect social marginal costs (Wang, 2003). Observers of such 
enterprises stress two features contradicting the conventional view: Public enterprises are highly 
inefficient, and their inefficiency is from the result of political pressures from the politicians who 
control them. The beneficiaries of the excess employment are often political supporters of the 
government, who value these jobs because they pay more than market wages. Excess 
employment and wages in public enterprises are not the only source of political benefits. Public
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enterprises in many cases produce goods desired by politicians rather than by consumers. More 
generally, a substantial body of empirical evidence documents both the superior efficiency of 
private firms relative to comparable public firms, and the improvement of efficiency after 
privatization (Wang, 2003).
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) focus on political considerations to study both public and 
private enterprises subject to political influence. They describe a game between the public, the 
politicians, and the enterprises manager, and they assume because the public is disorganized, 
politicians cater to interest groups, such as labour unions, rather than the median voter. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998) also assume that the relationship between politicians and managers is 
governed by incomplete contracts, so that residual rights of control rather than incentive 
contractors become the critical determinant of resource allocation. Under these assumptions, they 
derive implications of bargaining between politicians and enterprise managers over what 
enterprises do. In particular, they focus on the role of transfers between the public and private 
sector, including subsidies to enterprises and bribes to politicians.
With full corruption, the allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights between 
managers and politicians does not affect either the efficiency of the firm or the transfers it 
receives. This result implies, in particular, that with full corruption, neither commercialization 
nor privatization matters. The irrelevance proposition raises the basic puzzle: how does private 
ownership make a difference? After all, politicians are interested in influencing both private and 
public firms to deliver political benefits and can use subsidies to convince private firms to 
deliver these benefits. There is no magical line that separates firms from politicians once they are 
privatized.
8
The conclusion is Shleifer and Vishny (1998) have examined the behaviour of private 
and public enterprises in situations where politicians try to influence firms to pursue political 
objectives. When managers control firms, politicians use subsidies and bribes to convince them 
to pursue political objectives. When politicians control firms, managers use bribes to convince 
them not to push firms to pursue political objectives. In this context, they established that the 
allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights does not influence resource allocation when 
corruption is costless and treasury subsidies are equally costly across all firms. This conclusion 
raised a puzzle: does privatization matter, and if so how do they work? This question was 
approached by showing how restrictions on corruption and subsidization lead to real effects of 
corporatization and privatization. Corporatization raises the likelihood of restructuring when 
corruption is limited. Privatization of cash-flow rights further encourages restructuring when the 
government is limited in subsidizing profitable firms with rich shareholders. This result implies 
that the potentially profitable firms are the best candidates for privatization, since they refuse to 
dissipate their profits on excess employment, whereas the hopeless firms continue to be 
subsidized. Finally, privatization is more likely to be implemented when reformers want to 
restrict government spending and cannot obtain large political benefits from public firms.
Firth et al. (2013) also find that a higher cost of government is associated with lower firm 
value, lower stock and financial operating performance, and lower labour productivity. 
Furthermore, they find that provincial governments that incur higher administrative expenditures 
tend to collect more taxes and fees from companies, and spend less on social welfare and 
infrastructure. Thus, excessive administrative expenditures erode firm value and performance 
mainly because of local government’s grabbing hand working through the collection of excessive 
fees and other taxes.
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2.3 Corporate social responsibility -  helping hand
Kristoffersen et al. (2005) investigated the extent to which the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) challenges the validity of the traditional firm model, and summarized the 
development of the definition of CSR. McWillams and Siegel (2001) define it as “actions that 
appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firms and that which is required 
by law.” Friedman (1962; 1970) claimed that the social responsibility of the firm is to make 
profits, and he defines CSR as actions that violate the profit-maximizing objective. However, 
Kristoffersen et al. (2005) argue that the above definitions have weaknesses because they carry 
an underlying message that “assuming social responsibility is a non-commercial activity.” A 
good definition which should work under any model of the firm was proposed by Carroll (1979) 
as “the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of an 
organization at a given point in time.” Kristoffersen et al. (2005) concluded that “this is a good 
definition because it defines CSR as what it is: something fluid and ever-changing, and in fact a 
gauge of the business-society relationship itself.”
Jensen (2002) argues that wealth maximization should be the only objective of the firm, 
and suggests that the fundamental purpose of the corporation has become ambiguous as a result 
of the adoption of stakeholder theory. Therefore, there is confusion as to what role business has 
in society and what function it is expected to serve. Jensen (2002) suggests that “fuelling the 
controversy are political, social, evolutionary, and emotional forces that we don’t usually think 
of as operating in the domain of business and economics. There forces serve to reinforce a model 
of corporate behavior that draws on concepts of family and tribe.” Moreover, Jensen (2002) 
argues that stakeholder management fails as a managerial objective because it fails to provide a 
complete specification of the corporation purpose or objective function, and it appears that the 
stakeholder theory of Freeman (1984) is at least complementing value maximization. Jensen
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(2002) states enlightened value maximization is useful in the idea, and it provides the objective 
function that would be implied if it was already established that value maximization is the 
ultimate objective of the firm. Moreover, shareholders extract all their value; the value of the 
firm is a complex function of variables including the quality of the firm’s stakeholder relations, 
and positive synergies exist between the quality of the relations that the firm holds with at least 
some stakeholders and the value of the firm.
Kristoffersen et al. (2005) concludes that management needs to be clear about how CSR 
fits into the corporate objective function, and must clearly communicate to stakeholders whether 
CSR is pursued as a part of the wealth-maximizing objective or whether CSR is pursued with 
cost to owners.
Putterman and Dong (2000) state that SOEs created 8.5 million new jobs between 1984 
and 1992. Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) created 54.2 million jobs in the period, and 
by 1994, total employment in TVEs stood at 120 million, thereby exceeding the 1,127 million 
figures for industrial and all other SOEs combined. It concludes that China’s SOE will go down 
in history as the major player in the country’s post-1949 industrialization. It is hard to know 
whether a substantial number of SOEs can still be salvaged through a program of vigorous 
reforms, but given the inertial forces of the past two decades, one can be excused for writing an 
epitaph for China’s SOE sector as we once knew it. Li (2008) indicates that the government 
sector and state-owned enterprises, is necessary for maintaining macroeconomic stability, and 
given certain assumptions, public sector investment needs to account for about 50% of the 
economy’s total capital formation. Qi et al. (2000) find that the ownership structure composition 
and relative dominance by either the state or legal-person shareholdings can affect the 
performance of SOE transformed listed firms.
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A common conclusion in most studies is that Chinese state-owned enterprises do not 
operate efficiently because of ambiguous property rights and government intervention. However, 
I argue that it can be either a helping hand or grabbing hand. If it is helping hand, that means 
Chinese SOEs strive to achieve both financial and social objectives, such as job creation, to 
contribute to China’s macroeconomic and social stability. If it is grabbing hand, that means 
Chinese SOEs cannot perform on both financial and social objectives at the same time.
Li (2008) presented some arguments of Chinese SOEs: 1. State-owned enterprises have 
made an important contribution to China's macroeconomic stability and in the Chinese context; 
the state-owned enterprise sector must be sufficiently large so that public sector investment 
accounts for about 50% of the total capital formation. 2. Performance of the state-owned 
enterprises can be enhanced by promoting workers' participation in management by conducting a 
survey of workers' participation in management in large and medium-sized industrial enterprises 
in China's Henan province. Econometric analyses have been performed to explore the 
relationship between workers' participation and firm performance, finding evidence that 
participation does improve performance. 3. "Disguised unemployment" is addressed in the state- 
owned enterprises. The existing literature argues that the state-owned enterprises fail to use their 
labour force efficiently. Under this view, a high percentage of workers in state-owned enterprises 
are redundant and unemployed in a disguising manner as most of the people agree that these 
workers have to be laid off for the sake of efficiency. Disguised unemployment in the state sector 
may be due to insufficient aggregate demand rather than technical inefficiency. The econometric 
analyses find that an increase in aggregate demand leads to substantially higher productivity in 
the state-owned enterprises, allowing a substantial part of the redundant labour force to be 
efficiently employed. An argument is made for an active aggregate demand policy, rather than 
layoff of workers, as the primary solution to the problem of disguised unemployment.
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Chapter III 
Hypothesis development
McConnell and Servaes (1990) investigate the relation between Tobin’s Q and the 
structure of equity ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 for 1986, and they 
find a significant curvilinear relation (value first increases, then decreases as ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of officers and directors) between Tobin’s Q (y-axis) and the fraction 
of common stock owned by corporate insiders (x-axis). Wei and Varela (2003) find domestic 
institutional owners do not necessarily have the proper incentives to positively influence the 
firm's management in China as many are state-owned and managers are paid by the state. The 
robustness of the prior results is supported because firm performance is not an important 
determinant of state ownership. Rather, firm size and its strategic industry status are the main 
determinants of the state's equity ownership in China's newly privatized firms. Furthermore, Wei 
et al. (2005) find that foreign ownership is significantly positively related to stock market 
performance and the result suggests that when a government privatizes firms that were 
previously state-owned (retaining a significant ownership after privatization) then conflicts of 
interest among different shareholders may actually decrease firm value. This conflict of interest 
problem is further magnified by the agency problem in firms with high state ownership, since top 
managers are likely to be appointed by the government without meaningful personal ownership 
in these firms. However, when the government shareholdings decrease further and other 
shareholders become dominant, firm value increases.
Sun et al. (2002) find the relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance follows an inverted U-shape pattern since so many SOEs are not performing well 
and are heavily in debt. Too much government holding of SOE shares means too much control
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and interference in the economic operations of SOEs. Too little government holding of SOE 
shares means too little support from the government to pull the SOEs out from their difficulties. 
However, Ng et al. (2009) concludes that “a convex relationship (x-axis is state ownership and y- 
axis is Tobin’s Q) offers valuable guidance as to what extent state control should be given up in 
order to realize the potential economic benefits of privatization. State ownership and balance of 
control are better for Chinese SOEs than partial ownership and there is no optimal balance of 
state and private ownership. It achieves a deep study of the dynamic nature of privatization, state 
ownership and control, and their influence on firm performance in China.”
3.1 State ownership and market performance
The first objective of this study is to examine the relationship between state ownership 
and the stock market performance of publicly listed Chinese firms.
Tobin’s Q, dependent variable is used and is calculated in the same way as Ng et al. 
(2009), Wei and Varela (2003) and Loderer and Martin (1997):
Tobin’s Q = (Market value of equity + Book value of total liabilities)/Book value of total assets 
High state ownership implies low private ownership of low privatization because state 
ownership is defined as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Ng et al. (2009) point out that if 
a negative relationship is found between state ownership and performance, then it implies that 
privatization is beneficial as it would be positively related to performance. “High state ownership 
in the firm requires that the state hire agents to look after its own interest, and result in lower 
performance as government agents act in their own rather than that of the state’s best interest” 
(Wei and Varela, 2003). When privatization reaches a certain percentage the market performance 
will decrease since they lose the advantage of government resource and better policies of SOEs. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is:
HI: State share ownership is positively related to Tobin’s Q.
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The STATE variable is the percentages of shares in firms are holding by central 
government, local government, or solely government owned enterprises. This study also 
examines the square of state share ownership which the STATE2 effectively gives higher 
weightings in the regression to higher percentages of state shareholders. The variable STATE2 is 
calculated as the percentage of state shares squared. The relationships between state ownership 
and market performance are found to be non-linear curves and they are either convex or concave 
(Wei and Varela, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2002; Ng et al., 2009). This study 
hypothesizes that STATE2 (x-axis) is negatively related Tobin’s Q (y-axis), and it creates a 
concave which is an inverted U curve. This indicates that state ownership is positively related to 
market performance, but beyond an inflection point the relationship changes to become negative.
ASHARE variable is the percentage of the A-shares that are ordinary equity shares 
mostly held and traded by individuals. It is proposed to have a negative relationship with market 
performance because it should be opposite with STATE.
LEGAL is the percentage of ownership of shares from domestic institutions that are 
partially owned by local, provincial or central governments. It is proposed that it is positively 
related with market performance because as large block holders, they should reduce agency costs 
due to monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
EXEPER is calculated as the percentage of shares owned by executive directors of total 
shares outstanding. INDDIR is calculated as a percentage of number of independent directors of 
total number of directors. It is proposed that both variables are positively related to market 
performance because executives as profit-oriented individuals are seeking high profits.
Sun et al. (2002) find that leverage is negatively related to market performance of 
Chinese firms, so debt to equity is included in this study. LEVERAGE is the total book value of 
debt divided by total market value of equity. It is proposed that LEVERAGE will have a
15
negative relationship with market performance because “given the heavy financial risk and debt 
serving costs that debts posed for SOEs in a rapidly changing environment” (Ng et al., 2009).
Return on sales, which is calculated by dividing reported net income by total sales, is the 
earning measure which is proposed to be positively related to market performance because 
higher profitability should be related with higher market performance. This is used by Wang et al. 
(2004) as the determinant of the market performance of Chinese-listed firms.
Size is the natural logarithm of total book value of assets, and it is proposed to be 
negatively related to market performance because there are more agency costs and government 
bureaucracy with larger SOEs. The natural logarithm transformation of data is used because it is 
effective in normalizing positively skewed distributions.
ROA is the net income divided by total assets which are proposed to be positively related 
to market performance because better cash flow should be related with higher market 
performance.
DUAL is a dummy variable which indicates whether the same person plays two roles as 
both board chairmen and general manager. It is represented as 1 if board chairman and general 
manager are different persons and 0 if board chairman and general manager is the same person.
I also tested hypothesis by using the annual stock return as the measure of the stock 
market performance in place of Tobin’s Q. It appears that the inclusion of debt in Tobin’s Q is 
likely a source of the different results and differences in debt can materially influence Tobin’s Q 
differences between these groups. This is why there is a discrepancy in terms of regressions of 
Tobin’s Q and annual stock return. Ng et al. (2009) concludes that Tobin’s Q is a preferable 
measure of financial performance. See Appendix 2-4 for empirical results.
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3.2 State ownership and social performance
Putterman and Dong (2000) suggest that China experienced a much more limited 
transformation of its employment structure, unlike the Soviet Union, even as its output and 
investment structures were shifting dramatically to pave the way for a larger role for industry. 
SOE workers in China received reasonable wages and benefits, judged by the typical standard in 
China by comparing with rural counterparts. China’s strategy of keeping both wages and rural 
incomes low was employed to increase the rate of industrial investment. Further, they suggest 
that a partial explanation may be found by reconsidering the assumption that the state could have 
hired industrial labour in unlimited supply without paying higher wages. Therefore, “the state 
may have been acting in the interest of maximum industrial capital accumulation when, by 
curtailing employment and wage growth, it acted like a textbook monopolist.”
The second and also primary objective of this study is to examine the relationship 
between state ownership versus job creation and job stability. Can Chinese SOEs fulfill both 
social and corporate objectives? It is argued that job creation and stability are the primary 
objectives of Chinese SOEs since they contribute stronger government control and political 
stability.
The second hypothesis is:
H2: State share ownership is positively related to number of employees.
This study hypothesizes that STATE2 is negatively related, and it creates a concave curve 
where y-axis is number of employees and x-axis is percentage of state ownership. This indicates 
that state ownership is positively related to social performance, but beyond an inflection point 
the relationship changes to become negative.
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ASHARE variable is percentage of A-shares that are ordinary equity shares mostly held 
and traded by individuals. It is proposed to have a negative relationship with social performance 
because it should be opposite with STATE.
LEGAL shares which is the percentage of ownership of shares from domestic institutions 
that are partially owned by local, provincial or central governments. It is proposed that it is 
positively related with number of employees since the result should be consistent with STATE.
It is proposed that both EXEPER and INDDIR variables are negatively related to number 
of employees because executives are profit-oriented individuals that are seeking high profits and 
do not pay enough attention to job creation.
It is proposed that LEVERAGE and return of sales will have a negative relationship on 
number of employees because higher debt and less return lead to less hiring of employees.
Size is proposed to be positively related to market performance because there should be 
more employees in larger firms in terms of book value of total assets.
ROA is the net income divided by total assets, which is proposed to be positively related 
to number of employees because better cash flow should be related with more hiring for 
expending.
If the above hypothesis is consistent with results of the regression, the regression is run 
again with the dependent variable using the change in number of employees in Chinese SOEs. 
The objectives of Chinese SOEs are seeking profits, maintain job stability and contribute to 
social and political stability. Thus, the change of employees should be lower with higher state 
share ownership firms. This leads to hypothesis 3 as:
H3: State share ownership is negatively related to the change in number of employees.
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It is hypothesized that STATE2 is positively related with convex curve where y-axis is 
change in number of employees and x-axis is percentage of state ownership. This indicates that 
state ownership is negatively related to the change in number of employees since it is more stable, 
but beyond an inflection point the relationship changes to become positive.
It is proposed that ASHARE variable to have a negative relationship with social 
performance because it should be opposite with STATE. It is proposed that LEGAL is negatively 
related with the change in number of employees since the result should be consistent with 
STATE.
It is proposed that both EXEPER and INDDIR variables are negatively related to the 
change in number of employees because executives are profit-oriented individuals seeking high 
profits. To achieve their goal of maximizing profits the change in number of employees is 
minimized to keep firm stable.
It is proposed that LEVERAGE will have a negative relationship with the change in 
number of employees because higher debt leads to less hiring of employees.
Size, return on sales and return of assets are proposed to be positively related to change in 
number of employees because there should be more hiring activities for larger firms in terms of 
book value of total assets or when firms are performing well in terms of return and available cash.
In hypothesis 2 and 3, assets are used as an independent variable. Both number of 
employees and the change in number of employees are not standardized for the size of the firm.
In hypothesis 1, if a positive relationship is found between state ownership and social 
performance, then it implies that the objectives of Chinese SOEs are to seek profits and to create 
jobs. This leads to hypothesis 4:
H4: State share ownership is negatively related to number of employees divided by assets.
19
It is hypothesized that STATE2 is positively related creating a convex curve where y-axis 
is number of employees divided by assets and x-axis is percentage of state ownership. This 
indicates that state ownership is negatively related to the number of employees divided by assets. 
Beyond an inflection point the relationship changes to become positive.
It is proposed that ASHARE variable to have a positive relationship with social 
performance because it should be opposite with STATE. It is proposed that LEGAL is negatively 
related with the number of employees divided by assets since the result should be consistent with 
STATE.
It is proposed that both EXEPER and EMDDIR variables are negatively related to the 
change in number of employees because executives are profit-oriented individuals seeking high 
profits. In order to achieve their goal of maximizing profits they want to minimize the number of 
employees divided by assets.
It is proposed that LEVERAGE will have a positive relationship with the number of 
employees divided by assets because higher debt leads to less hiring of employees.
Size, return on sales and return on assets are proposed to be positively related to the 
number of employees divided by assets of employees because there should be more hiring 
activities for larger firms.
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Chapter IV 
Database and Methodology
4.1 Sample and data
The sample comprises publicly listed Chinese firms from Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) over the period January 1, 2001 to December 31, 
2011. Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 consists of 2,536 companies on average per year 
for 11 years. The total sample size is 27,896 firm-years. Table 2 reports the industry breakdown 
of the sample. The data was collected from Guo Tai An (GTA) information technology company, 
GTA gives sales, annual stock returns, total assets, total debts, total equity, net income and 
employee numbers. Stocks with a return on investment (ROE) greater than or less than 500% 
were deleted.
The panel data method was utilized to reduce the magnitude of the problem with omitted 
variables that are correlated with explanatory variables. It is better able to control for the effects 
of missing or unobserved variables. “Specifically, under the fixed-effect model, the intercepts are 
allowed to be different cross-sectional and hence the effects of the omitted variable can be 
captured” (Sun et al., 2002).
H-shares, which are another type of private shares from the Chinese market for firms that 
are listing and trading on Hong Kong Stock Exchange are not included in this study. Mcguinness 
and Ferguson (2005) find that foreign ownership of H-shares issuers is not related to corporate 
profitability. However, they also present preliminary evidence that profitability is generally 
higher in an issuer where two or more major foreign investors are present. That is because there 
is a separation of domestic and international investors to H-shares in Hong Kong since domestic 
Chinese investors cannot trade H-shares, but international investors can (Ng et al., 2009). Huang 
and Song (2005) find that H-shares issuers have performance declines less than domestic A-
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share issuers, and state-owned and legal person shares do in fact influence profitability of A- 
share issuers.
Table 3 provides detailed equity ownership structures of the four categories based on 
state ownership of partially privatized Chinese firms. For category one, where companies only 
hold less than 1 0 % state shares are considered, and the implication is that majority of the 
companies only hold less than 10% of state owned shares. This is consistent with results of 
negotiate A shares, which is that the lower state owned shares, the higher negotiate A shares the 
company holds. This ownership structure appears to have governance implications that impact 
performance when compared to companies with higher state ownership (Ng et al., 2009).
In this study, an unbalanced panel data set was used for 2001-2011.1 winsorized the data 
by eliminating all the outliners that are over and under three times the standard deviation. Each 
annual regression includes from 1,718 to 2,294 cross-sections. In addition, the panel least 
squares technique employed both period random and fixed effects. Microsoft Excel 2010 was 
used to collect the data from GTA, and IBM Statistics Version 21 was used to winsorize the data. 
Econometric software EViews 8  was used to analyze the data and test regressions.
Table 1
Summary statistics for partially privatized Chinese firms 2001-2011.
Employee Change of
Statistics
Tobin's
Q
Number/
Assets
Employee
Number
Employee
Number
State
Shares
Negotiate
Shares
N 19,513 14,818 17,350 15,062 19,852 19,852
Mean 0.49 0.18 3.19 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 1 0.52
Std Dev 0.27 0.15 0.60 0.95 0.25 0.28
Min 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 0 -1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Max 2.70 1 . 0 0 4.81 5.68 0.97 1 . 0 0
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Statistics
Domestic
Legal
Shares
Executive
Shares
Independent
Director
Shares
Debt to 
Equity Size
Return
on
Assets
N 19,852 19,852 16,271 19,813 19,815 19,814
Mean 0 . 1 2 0.03 0.33 1.31 21.52 0.03
Std Dev 0 . 2 0 0.08 0 . 1 0 2.14 1.36 0.14
Min 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 -11.57 10.84 -1 . 0 0
Max 0.97 0.33 0.80 14.38 30.50 1 . 0 0
This table presents yearly statistics for the sample of privatized Chinese firms from 2001-2011 listed on 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange. Tobin’s Q, employee number/assets, employee number and 
change of employee number, statistics are presented including mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum figures. State, negotiate A, domestic legal shares, independent director, are measured as 
percentage fractions of total shares. Debt to equity is measured as total debt divided by total equity. 
Return on assets is measured as net income divided by total shares.
Table 2
Industries of the Chinese SOE firms 2001-2011
Industry code Industry N %
1 Finance 451 1.62%
2 Utilities 2,156 7.73%
3 Properties 1,496 5.36%
4 Conglomerates 4,444 15.93%
5 Industry 17,358 62.22%
6 Commerce 1,991 7.14%
Total 27,896 1 0 0 .0 0 %
This table consists of 27896 companies listed in both SHSE and SZSE from 2001-2011. The companies 
are classified into 6  groups according to GTA database classification.
Table 3
Percentage State Ownership 2001-2011
Share type in % Statistics
1. Privately owned 
(<10%)
2. Mixed 
(10-30%)
3. Mixed 
(>30-<50%)
4. State owned 
(>50%)
State shares Means 0.01 0.22 0.41 0.62
Std Dev 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08
Negotiate A share Means 0.60 0.53 0.43 0.31
Std Dev 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.12
Domestic Legal Shares Means 0.21 0.11 0.05 0.01
Std Dev 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.04
Independent Director 
Shares Means 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30
Std Dev 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12
Executive Shares Means 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
Std Dev 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00
Sample size n 8,368 2,201 3,073 3,676
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4.2 Regressions with each hypothesis
HI: State share ownership is positive related to Tobin’s Q.
I specify the following regression to test the first hypothesis with the expected signs 
above the coefficients of the independent variables:
Tobin’s Q = BO + B1 STATE + B2 STATE2 + B3 ASHARE + B4 LEGAL + B5 EXECUT 
+ B6  INDDIR + B7 LEVERAGE + B8  ROS + B9 SIZE + B10 ROA + B11 DUAL +
B12 IND1 + B13 EMD2 + B14 IND3 + B15 IND4 + B16 IND5 
Table 4a
Specification of regression variables -  Tobin’s Q
Variables Description________________________ Measure________________________ Expected sign
Tobin’s Q 
STATE
Dependent variable 
Market performance 
State ownership
Tobin's Q
Percentage of shares owned by government Positive
STATE2 State ownership Square o f percentage o f  shares owned by government Negative
ASHARE Private ownership
Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by 
individuals Negative
LEGAL Legal ownership Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions Positive
EXECUT Executive ownership Percentage o f shares owned by executives Positive
INDDIR Executive ownership Percentage o f independent directors Positive
LEVERAGE Leverage Total debt /  total equity Negative
ROS Return on sales Net income /  total sales Positive
SIZE Size o f  SOE Logarithm of total assets Negative
ROA Return on assets Net income/ total assets Positive
DUAL
Dual responds of 
directors
Dummy variable of 1 if board chairman and general 
manager is
different person, and 0 if board of chairman and general 
manager
is the same person Negative or positive
IND1 Industry
Dummy variable of 1 if it is a finance firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-finance firm Negative or positive
IND2 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if  it is a utility firm, 
and 0  if it is a non-utility firm Negative or positive
IND3 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a property firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-property firm Negative or positive
IND4 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a conglomerate firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-conglomerate firm Negative or positive
IND5 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if  it is a industry firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-industry firm Negative or positive
This table explains the variable used in this regression, their measurement and their expected signs. The 
key dependent variables of interest are market performance and state ownership.
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Table 4a summarized the variables in this regression, gives their definition and their 
measurement. “Finding a relationship can answer the question as to whether privatization is 
beneficial to Chinese firm performance” (Ng et al., 2009). It should benefit Chinese SOEs by 
reducing agency costs and allocating property rights to managers and owners (Wei and Varela, 
2003), and privatization is necessary for improving state-owned firms (Boycko et al., 1996; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
The coefficient for the variable of STATE2 in combination with the coefficient for 
STATE can be used to determine whether the relationship between performance and STATE is 
convex or concave, where convexity is a characteristic of U-shape or quadratic and concavity is a 
characteristic of an inverted U-shape. Wei and Varela (2003) also indicated that the inflection in 
the regression can be computed by equating the partial derivative 5Q/5STATE to zero.
H2: State share ownership is positively related to number of employees.
I specify the following regression to test the second hypothesis with the coefficients of 
the independent variables:
EMPLOYEES = B0 + B1 STATE + B2 STATE2 + B3 ASHARE + B4 LEGAL
+ B5 EXECUT + B6  INDDIR + B7 LEVERAGE + B8  ROS + B9 SIZE + B10 ROA
+ B11 DUAL + B12IND1 + B13 IND2 + B14 IND3 + B15 IND4 + B16IND5
Table 4b summarized the variables in this regression, gives their definition and their 
measurement.
H3: State share ownership is negatively related to the change in number of employees.
CHANGE = B0 + B1 STATE + B2 STATE2 + B3 ASHARE + B4 LEGAL + B5 EXECUT 
+ B6  INDDIR + B7 LEVERAGE + B8  ROS + B9 SIZE + B10 ROA 
+ B11 DUAL + B12 IND1 + B13 END2 + B14 IND3 + B15 IND4 + B16 IND5
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Table 4b
Specification of regression variables -  number of employees
Variables Description________________________ Measure________________________ Expected sign
EMPLOYEE Dependent variable 
Social performance
Logarithm o f number o f employees
STATE State ownership Percentage o f shares owned by government Positive
STATE2 State ownership Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government 
Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by
Negative
ASHARE Private ownership individuals Negative
LEGAL Legal ownership Percentage of shares owned by legal institutions Positive
EXECUT Executive ownership Percentage of shares owned by executives Negative
INDDIR Executive ownership Percentage o f independent directors Negative
LEVERAGE Leverage Total debt /  total equity Negative
ROS Return on sales Net income /  total sales Negative
SIZE Size o f SOE Logarithm o f total assets Positive
ROA Return on assets 
Dual responds of
Net income/ total assets
Dummy variable o f 1 if board chairman and general 
manager is
different person, and 0 if  board of chairman and general 
manager
Negative
DUAL directors is the same person
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a finance firm,
Negative or positive
IND1 Industry and 0  if it is a non-finance firm 
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a utility firm,
Negative or positive
IND2 Industry and 0 if it is a non-utility firm
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a property firm,
Negative or positive
IND3 Industry and 0 if it is a non-property firm
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a conglomerate firm,
Negative or positive
IND4 Industry and 0 if it is a non-conglomerate firm 
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a industry firm,
Negative or positive
IND5 Industry and 0 if it is a non-industry firm Negative or positive
This table explains the variable used in this regression, their measurement and their expected signs. The 
key dependent variables of interest are social performance and state ownership.
Table 4c summarized the variables in this regression, gives their definition and their 
measurement.
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Table 4c
Specification of regression variables -  change in number of employees
Variables Description________________________ Measure________________________ Expected sign
CHANGE
STATE
Dependent variable 
Social performance 
State ownership
Change in number o f employees 
Percentage o f shares owned by government Negative
STATE2 State ownership Square o f percentage o f  shares owned by government Positive
ASHARE Private ownership
Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by 
individuals Positive
LEGAL Legal ownership Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions Negative
EXECUT Executive ownership Percentage of shares owned by executives Positive
INDDIR Executive ownership Percentage of independent directors Positive
LEVERAGE Leverage Total debt /  total equity Negative
ROS Return on sales Net income / total sales Positive
SIZE S izeo fS O E Logarithm o f total assets Positive
ROA Return on assets Net income/ total assets Positive
DUAL
Dual responds of 
directors
Dummy variable of 1 if  board chairman and general 
manager is
different person, and 0 if board of chairman and general 
manager
is the same person Negative or positive
IND1 Industry
Dummy variable of 1 if it is a finance firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-finance firm Negative or positive
IND2 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if  it is a utility firm, 
and 0 if  it is a non-utility firm Negative or positive
IND3 Industry
Dummy variable of 1 if it is a property firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-property firm Negative or positive
IND4 Industry
Dummy variable of 1 if  it is a conglomerate firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-conglomerate firm Negative or positive
IND5 Industry
Dummy variable of 1 if  it is a industry firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-industry firm Negative or positive
This table explains the variable used in this regression, their measurement and their expected signs. The 
key dependent variables of interest are social performance and state ownership.
H4: State share ownership is negatively related to numbers of employees divided by assets.
EMPLOYEE/SIZE = BO + B1 STATE + B2 STATE2 + B3 ASHARE + B4 LEGAL 
+ B5 EXECUT + B6  INDDIR + B7 LEVERAGE + B8  ROS + B9 SIZE + BIO ROA 
+ B11 DUAL+ B12 IND1 + B13 IND2 + B14 IND3 + B15 IND4 + B16IND5
Table 4d summarized the variables in this regression, gives their definition and their 
measurement.
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Table 4d
Specification of regression variables -  number of employees divided by assets
Variables________Description________________________ Measure________________________ Expected sign
EMPLOYEE/SIZE
STATE
Dependent variable 
Social performance 
State ownership
Logarithm o f num ber o f  employees/Logarithm o f assets 
Percentage o f shares owned by government Positive
STATE2 State ownership Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government Negative
ASHARE Private ownership
Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by 
individuals Positive
LEGAL Legal ownership Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions Negative
EXECUT Executive ownership Percentage o f  shares owned by executives Positive
INDDIR Executive ownership Percentage o f independent directors Positive
LEVERAGE Leverage Total debt /  total equity Positive
ROS Return on sales Net income /  total sales Positive
SIZE Size of SOE Logarithm of total assets Negative
ROA Return on assets Net income/ total assets Positive
DUAL
Dual responds of 
directors
Dummy variable o f 1 if board chairman and general 
manager is
different person, and 0 if  board o f  chairman and general 
manager
is the same person Negative or positive
IND1 Industry
Dummy variable o f  1 if it is a finance firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-finance firm Negative or positive
IND2 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a utility firm, 
and 0 if  it is a non-utility firm Negative or positive
IND3 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a  property firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-property firm Negative or positive
IND4 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a conglomerate firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-conglomerate firm Negative or positive
IND5 Industry
Dummy variable o f 1 if it is a industry firm, 
and 0 if it is a non-industry firm Negative or positive
This table explains the variable used in this regression, their measurement and their expected signs. The 
key dependent variables of interest are social performance and state ownership.
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Chapter V 
Results
5.1 State ownership and market performance
5.1.1 State ownership and Tobin’s Q
Table 5a presents panel regression results on the relationship between state ownership 
and Tobin’s Q with random and fixed effects. See Appendix 4a and 4b for original regression 
results from Eviews 8 .
Regression results are done by using panel least squares for 2001-2011 with both period 
random and fixed effects. Both regressions are highly significant at an alpha level of one percent 
with F statistics of 383.931 and 242.922 respectively. The adjusted R-squares are 0.277 and 
0.283 respectively. Only the random effect is in consideration here since in the fixed effect, 
STATE is not significant.
The state ownership relationship with performance is examined in the variable, STATE 
and STATE2 and they together represent the shape of the relationship between state ownership 
and market performance. Results show that STATE is positively significant related at an alpha 
level of ten percent and the beta coefficient is 0.04. This result is consistent with hypothesis one 
that state share ownership is positively related to market performance using the dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the result does not imply that privatization is beneficial to SOE 
performance as Ng et al. (2009) found.
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Table 5a - Results for regression with dependent variable -  Tobin’s Q
Independent 
Variables -  Tobin’s Q Random Fixed
Intercept 0 .1 2 *** 0.13***
(3.49) (3.59)
STATE 0.04 -0 . 0 1
(1.62) (-0.33)
STATE2 - 0  17*** -0 .1 0 ***
(-4.42) (-2.53)
ASHARE -0 .0 2 * -0 . 0 2
(-1 .8 6 ) (-1.50)
LEGAL -0.05*** -0.06***
(-4.01) (-4.73)
EXECUT -0.65*** -0.60***
(-20.89) (-18.17)
INDDIR Q J4*** 0.07**
(7.48) (2.42)
LEVERAGE 0.03*** 0.03***
(28.35) (28.26)
ROS -0 39*** -0 39***
(-44.65) (-44.49)
SIZE 0 .0 2 *** 0 .0 2 ***
(11.24) (11.39)
ROA -0 .1 2 *** -0.13***
(-8.74) (-9.08)
DUAL 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
(0.82) (0 .6 6 )
IND1 0.08*** 0.07***
(4.57) (4.52)
IND2 -0.05*** -0.05***
(-5.73) (-5.83)
IND3 0.07*** 0.07***
(8 .0 2 ) (8 .0 0 )
IND4 -0 04*** -0 04***
(-4.88) (-4.99)
IND5 -0 04*** -0 04***
(-5.97) (-6 .1 0 )
N 15,965 15,965
Adjusted R-Squared 0.277 0.283
F Statistic 383.931 242.922
p value 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient, and significance levels are indicated by: 
*at the 10% level **at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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The STATE2 variable is negative and significantly related to Tobin’s Q at the one 
percent alpha level, and the coefficient is -0.17. This implies that high state controlled SOEs 
are related to lower market performance suggesting that privatizing an SOE appears to be 
beneficial.
Table 5a results also reports that the ASHARE variable is negatively related to Tobin’s 
Q at an alpha level of ten percent and the beta coefficient is -0.02. This confirms the 
preliminary findings of lower financial performance associated with privately controlled firms 
and the concave shaped relationship with Tobin's Q. LEGAL share ownership is significantly 
related to Tobin’s Q at an alpha level of one percent level in both fixed and random effects 
regressions. Beta coefficients are -0.05 and -0.06 which are lower than the state ownership effect 
(STATE2) with betas of -.17 and -.10. This negative relationship is also found previously in the 
study of Wei et al. (2005) who also perform panel regressions. Such a negative effect is 
plausible. Institutional ownership may behave like state ownership because many of the legal 
entities that own shares are partially or fully owned by different levels of government (Wei and 
Varela, 2005). Government can have political interests at the expense of a profit objective.
Interestingly, when looking at firm governance factors, EXECUT shares has the largest 
effect (beta coefficients are -0.65 and -.60) significant at an alpha level of one percent level.
This dominant negative effect suggest high agency costs and conflicts between SOE executives 
and multiple shareholders, state, private and institution owners germane to SOE ownership 
structures. This further suggests that executives exert high agency costs in the pursuit of 
personal benefits such as perquisites and political favour. Indeed, some SOE managers achieve 
substantial personal political power to obtain influential positions in the Communist Party of 
China and in local and state government. On the other hand, independent directors (INDDIR) 
have significant and positive effects at an alpha level of one percent on Tobin’s Q. The effect is
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substantial with a beta coefficient of 0.14. This result showing the beneficial role of 
independent directors in firm performance suggests support for the recipe to make boards 
better by increasing board independence (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Gordon, 2007).
Lastly, Table 5a results show that DUAL roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board 
appear to have no significant effects on firm value performance with coefficients of 0 .0 0 .
Perhaps the real power that affects SOE performance comes from above that is the state and 
institutional owners of the firm.
When looking at firm characteristics, SIZE and LEVERAGE are positive (beta 
coefficients are 0.02 and 0.03) and significantly related to Tobin’s Q at an alpha level of one 
percent. These results show that larger SOEs and more leveraged firms are related to better 
financial performance. The leverage relation is contrary to the hypothesized coefficient sign. The 
profitability variables, including return on sales and return on assets, are negative and 
significantly related to Tobin’s Q at an alpha level of one percent with coefficients of -0.39 and 
-0.12. Lastly, I find no relationship between all of the industry control variables except for 
industrial firms (IND5). It is positively related to Tobin’s Q at an alpha level of one percent 
with a coefficient of 0.05. The Hausman test was performed to determine which method is 
superior (random or fixed effects). The result shows at a p-value of 0, the fixed effects are better 
than random effects in the regression. See Appendix 13 for original results from Eviews 8 .
Based on the positive STATE and negative STATE2 relationships, the state ownership in 
Chinese SOEs (x-axis) and Tobin’s Q (y-axis) is a concave inverted U-shape pattern. This 
concave relationship implies that highly state controlled SOEs are related to lower market 
performance, as well as highly privately controlled SOEs. Thus, privatization toward private 
control does not appear to benefit financial performance. This conclusion supports the first 
hypothesis that state ownership is related to financial performance as measured by Tobin's Q.
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On the other hand, an alternative explanation could be that firms with poor performance (lower 
Tobin’s Q) attract lower ownership from non-state investors. The conclusion about this concave 
relationship is in agreement with the study of Sun et al. (2002). It differs from studies of Wei et 
al. (2005) that concluded this relationship is convex shaped. Ng et al. (2009) mentioned that an 
extension would be examining stock market returns, and I used annual stock return as a second 
financial performance measure in this study. The results have been included in Appendix 2.
To check the concave relationship between state ownership and market performance, this 
study also uses graphs of both mean and median of Tobin’s Q and annual stock returns based on 
mixed levels of state ownership (groups with each 1 0 % interval of state ownership).
Figure la and lb are used to illustrate the nature of this relationship between state 
ownership and Tobin’s Q. It shows Tobin’s Q increases from 0.3 to about 0.5 when state 
ownership changes from 1 0 % to 2 0 % from private controlled (category 1 ) to mixed control 
SOEs (categories 2 and 3 with state ownership is 20% to 50%). When state control is above 50% 
(category 4), Tobin’s Q remains close to 0.5 similar to the mixed control firms. However, when 
state ownership is above 70%, Tobin's Q decreases to around 0.4. It is a very similar pattern by 
using medians. This preliminary examination shows that the state control relationship with 
performance is concave or inverted U-shape.
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Figure la
Mean of Tobin’s Q with percentage of state ownership
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Figure lb
Median of Tobin’s Q with percentage of state ownership
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5.2 State ownership and social performance
5.2.1 State ownership and number of employees
Table 5b presents panel regression results on the relationship between state ownership 
and employment. Both random and fixed effect regressions are significant at the one percent 
alpha level with F statistics of 618.09 and 385.22 with adjusted R-squares of 0.400 and 0.403 
respectively. Both random and fixed effect results show that STATE has positive and significant 
(at the one percent alpha level) effects on employment numbers with coefficients of 0.29 and 
0.23 respectively. This positive effect is consistent with hypothesis 2 that state share ownership 
is positively related to number of employees. Therefore, these results suggest support for the 
notion that Chinese SOEs have a profit orientation and provide employment. STATE2 has 
significant (at the one percent alpha level) negative effects with employment with coefficients of 
-.19 and -.24 for random and fixed effects. Together, STATE and STATE2 results indicate that 
state ownership has a nonlinear relationship that is concave or n-shaped with employment. This 
pattern would imply that employment at SOE's is higher when there is more state ownership up 
to an inflection point. After which, employment begins to decrease with increasing state 
ownership. See Appendix 5a and 5b for original regression testing results from Eviews 8 .
Private ownership through ASHAREs has significant (at the five percent alpha level) and 
positive effects on the number of employees with a coefficient of 0.05 under fixed effect. This 
result indicates that privatization can benefit the Chinese economy with job creation. LEGAL 
institution ownership has no significant effects on employment numbers which concurs with the 
alternate explanation that legal shareholders are more concerned about corporate objectives than 
social ones. Looking at firm governance factors, EXECUT ownership has significantly (at the 
one percent alpha level) negative effects on employee numbers with a coefficient of -0.32. This 
result suggests that executives tend to reduce and not create employment. Drawing from agency
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theory perspective, these executives have market incentives (stock ownership) for personal 
benefit to demonstrate achieving profit objectives, and respond to this incentive by cutting labor 
to do so. Hence, executives' stock shares, which have tangible market value, commands their 
alignment with profit objectives at the expense of social ones to provide employment. Therefore, 
results on CEO duality appears to have a negative and less significant (at the ten percent alpha 
level) effect. Thus, as a measure of CEO power, duality furthers the CEO's alignment with 
corporate objectives over social ones to provide employment. Results on board independence 
(INDDIR) also have significant (at the one percent alpha level) negative effects on employee 
numbers with a coefficient of -0.35. Results affirm the view that independent directors are 
more aligned with the interests of shareholders, being more oriented toward corporate 
objectives which comes at the expense of social objectives.
Examining firm factors, firm size has significant (at the one percent alpha level) effects 
with coefficients of 0.27 and 0.28 for random and fixed effects. It is expected that larger firms 
would inherently hire more people. LEVERAGE has a significant and small negative effect on 
employment at the one percent alpha level with a coefficient of -0.01 in both models. To explain, 
debt can constrain operating capital to hire because of interest costs to service this debt. Return 
on sales is also negative and significantly (at the one percent alpha level) related to number of 
employees with a coefficient of -0.34. As well, return on assets is negative and significantly 
related (at the five percent alpha level) with a coefficient of -0.08 for both models. These effects 
can be explained as a consequence of the economic trade-off between profitability and 
employment costs. Finally, there are some significant effects from the industry control variables 
on employment. Finance and property (IND1 and 3) are negatively related while industrial 
(IND5) is positively related to number of employees.
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Table 5b - Results for regression with dependent variable -  Number of Employees
Independent 
Variables -  # of employees Random Fixed
Intercept -2.56*** -2.81***
(-34.43) (-35.21)
STATE q 2 9 *** 0.23***
(4.88) (3.72)
STATE2 -0.24*** -0.19**
(-2 .8 6 ) (-2 .2 2 )
ASHARE -0 . 0 1 0.05**
(-0.53) (2.09)
LEGAL 0.03 0 . 0 1
(0.87) (0.04)
EXECUT -0 32*** -0.14*
(-4-25) (-1.76)
INDDIR -0.35*** -0.06
(-8.69) (-1 .0 1 )
LEVERAGE -0 .0 1 *** -0 .0 1 ***
(-4.93) (-5.12)
ROS -0.34*** -0.34***
(-19.12) (-18.61)
SIZE 0.27*** 0.28***
(80.83) (80.81)
ROA -0.08** -0.08**
(-2 .0 0 ) (-2 .1 2 )
DUAL -0 . 0 2 -0 .0 2 *
(-1.51) (-1.79)
IND1 -0.37*** -0.38***
(-10.59) (-10.83)
IND2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1
(0.07) (0.39)
IND3 -0 49*** -0.50***
(-26.81) (-27.09)
IND4 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1
(0.89) (0.73)
IND5 0.13*** Q
(9.20) (9.42)
N 14,819 14,819
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4 0.403
F Statistic 618.09 385.222
p value 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient, and significance levels are indicated by: 
*at the 10% level **at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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The above results indicate that state governance is positively related to number of 
employees. It shows state governed firms appear to be achieving not only high employment but 
also stable performance which means they are poorer in creating new employment. Privatized 
firms are much better at creating job growth. The Hausman test was performed to determine 
which method is superior (random or fixed effects). The result shows at a p-value of 0, the fixed 
effects are better than random effects in the regression. See Appendix 13 for original results from 
Eviews 8 .
To check the positive relationship between state ownership and number of employees, a 
graph of the mean and median natural logarithm of employee numbers relative to mixed levels of 
state ownership (groups with each 10% of state ownership) is presented. Both figure 2a and 
figure 2b show the positive relationship of number of employees with state ownership. This 
indicates that companies with higher state ownership have more employees which is consistent 
to earlier results.
Figure 2a
Mean of number of employees with percentage of state ownership
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Figure 2b
Median of number of employees with percentage of state ownership
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5.2.2 State ownership and the change in number of employees
The relationship between state ownership and employment stability, the second measure 
of social performance is studied. See Appendix 6 a and 6 b for original regression testing results 
from Eviews 8 .
Table 5c presents panel regression results on the relationship between state ownership and 
the change in number of employees. Both random and fixed effect regressions are significant at 
the one percent alpha level with F statistics of 13.17 and 19.25 respectively. Table 5c shows that 
STATE has significant (at the one percent alpha level) negative effects on the change of 
employee numbers with a coefficient of -0.38. This is consistent with hypothesis 3 that state 
share ownership is related to more employment stability. This relationship appears to be non­
linear because STATE2 has significant (at the one percent alpha level) positive effects with a 
coefficient of - 1.40. This is a convex shaped relationship which implies that as state ownership 
increases, change in employment decreases. This indicates employment stability increases. 
Viewing Figure 3a, beyond an inflection point of state ownership the change in employment
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increases, if an SOE is more socially concerned, it will hire more people; if the SOE is more 
concerned about corporate profitability, it will fire more people. Therefore, the positive effect 
seems to confer more employment flexibility depending on the objective. Overall, this result 
lends some support to the proposition of a social objective of Chinese SOEs. The other variable 
of ownership, LEGAL institution ownership has significant (at the five percent alpha level) 
positive effects with a coefficient o f . 18. This means that legal ownership confers more 
employment change or less employment stability in SOEs. This suggests that institutional 
shareholders confer employment flexibility to SOE’s. Similarly observing governance, both 
EXECUT shares and board independence (INDDIR) have similar effects of conferring 
employment flexibility. Both of them are positive and significantly related (at the one percent 
alpha level) to the change of employees with coefficients of 1.16 and 0.45 respectively. 
Executives and independent directors appear to have the power to increase employment changes 
by hiring or firing more employees whether they are aligned with shareholder and corporate 
wealth objectives, or they are aligned with state owners’ political objectives for social 
performance such as stability. The Hausman test was performed to determine which method is 
superior (random or fixed effects). The result shows at a p-value of 0, the fixed effects are better 
than random effects in the regression. See Appendix 13 for original results from Eviews 8 .
Figure 3a and 3b show the yearly change of employment based on state ownership. It 
shows a negative state and employment change relationship (same with medians). This indicates 
that companies with higher state ownership have more employment stability. For example, 
employee stability increases visibly where state ownership exceeds 2 0  percent, and beyond 60 
percent, employment change decreases dramatically where it falls below zero in highly state 
controlled SOEs.
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Table 5c - Results for regression with dependent variable -  change of Employees
Independent 
Variables -  change of employees Random Fixed
Intercept ] 1 *** -0.76***
(-6.48) (-4-24)
STATE -0.38*** -0.05
(-2.79) (-0.35)
STATE2 1.40** 0.06
(2 .1 0 ) (0.30)
ASHARE 0.06 -0.10*
(1.15) (-1 .6 8 )
LEGAL 0.07 0.18**
(0.94) (2.54)
EXECUT 1.16*** 0  9 7 ***
(5.31) (4.37)
INDDIR 0.45*** 0.27*
(3.23) (1.71)
LEVERAGE 0.00 0.00
(-0.79) (-0.61)
ROS 0.16*** 0.14***
(3.91) (3.56)
SIZE 0.05*** 0 04***
(7.24) (5.72)
ROA 0.1 -0.05
(0.99) (-0.51)
DUAL -0.03 -0.03
(-1.20) (-1.10)
IND1 0.03 0.03
(0.43) (0.38)
IND2 -0.02 -0.14
(-0.53) (-1.07)
IND3 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (-0.01)
IND4 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.61) (-0.47)
IND5 0.01 0.00
(0.20) (-0.10)
N 12,769 12,769
Adjusted R-Squared 0.015 0.035
F Statistic 13.175 19.251
p value 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient, and significance levels are indicated by: 
*at the 10% level **at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Figure 3a
Mean of change in number of employees with percentage of state ownership
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Figure 3b
Median of change in number of employees with percentage of state ownership
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5.2.3 State ownership and number of employees divided by assets
A valid criticism of using employment as a dependent variable to study the state 
ownership effects is that it does not account for size differences in SOEs. In order to rule out the 
explanation that higher state ownership is associated with larger firms and therefore have higher 
employment, this study offers another measure of employment which adjusts for size by dividing 
employment by total assets. See Appendix 7a and 7b for original regression testing results from 
Eviews 8 .
Table 5d presents panel regression result on the relationship between state ownership and 
number of employees divided by assets. Both random and fixed effect results show that 
STATE has a negative effect on number of employees and significant at the one percent alpha 
level with a coefficient of -.09. STATE2 has significant (at the one percent alpha level) positive 
effects with employment with a coefficient of .12. STATE and STATE2 t o g e t h e r  results 
indicate that state ownership has a nonlinear relationship that is convex or U-shaped with 
number of employees. This pattern would imply that employment at SOE’s is higher at first 
with private controlled firms then it becomes lower when there is more state ownership up to an 
inflection point. After which, employment begins to increase with increasing state ownership in 
which highly state controlled SOEs have the highest employment. This implication appears to 
be valid as privately controlled firms in this study offer relatively high employment as well as 
state controlled firms.
Private shares (A shares) appear to have no significant effect on size adjusted 
employment. However, the result shows that LEGAL institutions have a significant (at the one 
percent alpha level) negative effect with beta coefficient of - .03. A reasonable explanation is
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that legal shareholders are more corporate profit oriented towards versus social employment 
objectives.
Like the previous result, EXECUT ownership again has significant (at the one percent 
alpha level) negative effects on employee numbers with coefficients of -0.14 and -0.15 in both 
models. These results suggest that ownership of executives is associated with less 
employment. As earlier discussed, executives have market incentives for personal benefit to 
cut labor costs in order to maximize profitability. Hence, executives' stock shares do create 
alignment with profit objectives of shareholders at the expense of employment as expected. With 
respect to board independence, the result shows that it has a significant (at the one percent 
alpha level) positive effect on employment adjusted for size with coefficients of .09 and .12 
respectively. Independent directors could be appointed by the central government who are 
aligned with its interest in ensuring that SOE's fulfill both corporate and social objectives. 
CEO duality appears in Table 5d to show no significant effect.
With respect to firm characteristics, return on sales has significant (at the one percent 
alpha level) positive effects on size adjusted employment with a coefficient of .03. Intuitively, 
one would expect that profitability would be associated with more employment because 
profitability should expand employment. The other firm variables, leverage and return on assets, 
have no significant effects. The Hausman test was performed to determine which method is 
superior (random or fixed effects). The result shows at a p-value of 0, the fixed effects are better 
than random effects in the regression. See Appendix 13 for original results from Eviews 8 .
To check the convex relationship between state ownership and social performance, this 
study also uses graphs of both mean and median of number of employees divided by assets based 
on mixed levels of state ownership (groups with each 1 0 % of state ownership).
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Table 5d - Results for regression with dependent variable -  number of employees divided by 
assets
Independent 
Variables -  number of employees 
divided by assets Random Fixed
Intercept 0.30*** 0.29***
(13.53) (12.14)
STATE -0 09*** -0 09***
(-4.99) (-4.82)
STATE2 0 .1 2 *** 0 . 12* * *
(4.56) (4.49)
AS HARE 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
(-0.42) (-0.38)
LEGAL -0.03*** -0.03***
(-2.99) (-2.92)
EXECUT -0.15*** -0.14***
(-6.47) (-5.92)
INDDIR 0  09* * * 0 . 12* * *
(7.51) (6.24)
LEVERAGE 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
(-1.45) (1.43)
ROS 0.03*** 0.03***
(5.55) (5.46)
SIZE -0 .0 1 * * * - 0 .0 1 * * *
(-7.27) (-7.07)
ROA 0.01 0.01
(0.90) (0.67)
DUAL 0 . 0 0 0.01
(1-47) (1.53)
IND1 0  0 4 * * * q  0 4 * * *
(3.83) (3.79)
IND2 0 .0 1 * * 0 .0 1 * *
(2.55) (2.53)
IND3 0.16*** 0.16***
(28.75) (28.68)
IND4 0 .0 1 * 0.01
(1.67) (1.62)
IND5 0 . 0 0 0 .0 0
(1.04) ( 1 .0 0 )
N 14,818 14,818
Adjusted R-Squared 0.096 0.096
F Statistic 99.883 61.824
p value 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis jelow each coefficient, and significance levels are indicated by:
*at the 10% level **at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Figure 4a is based on mean of number of employees divided by assets with state 
ownership. Figure 4b is based on medians of number of employees divided by assets, and it has 
very similar pattern with figure 4a. They are consistent with the results of the regressions.
Figure 4a
Mean of employee numbers/assets with percentage of state ownership
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Figure 4b
Median of employee numbers/assets with percentage of state ownership
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5.3 Robustness
To check the robustness of the conclusions, the panel regression results are rerun using 
the cross-section least squares method. Qualitatively the results are similar. See Appendix 8 to 12 
for original regression testing results from Eviews 8.
Table 6
Correlations of explanatory factors to performance
STA TE STA TE2 A SH A RE L E G A L EX EC U T IN D D IR L EV ER A G E R O S S IZ E R O A
STA TE 1.000 0.959 -0.460 -0.415 -0.236 -0.217 0.026 -0.018 0.105 -0.079
STA TE2 0.959 1.000 -0.456 -0.378 -0.197 -0.202 0.013 0.011 0.125 -0.064
A SH A RE -0.460 -0.456 1.000 -0.292 -0.152 0.200 0.053 -0.040 0.094 -0.143
L E G A L -0.415 -0.378 -0.292 1.000 -0.038 -0.018 -0.048 0.023 -0.176 0.087
EX EC U T -0.236 -0.197 -0.152 -0.038 1.000 0.118 -0.110 0.109 -0.106 0.284
IN D D IR -0.217 -0.202 0.200 -0.018 0.118 1.000 0.019 0.040 0.119 0.040
LEV E R A G E 0.026 0.013 0.053 -0.048 -0.110 0.019 1.000 -0.062 0.349 -0.056
R O S -0.018 0.011 -0.040 0.023 0.109 0.040 -0.062 1.000 0.179 0.178
SIZ E 0.105 0.125 0.094 -0.176 -0.106 0.119 0.349 0.179 1.000 -0.025
RO A -0.079 -0.064 -0.143 0.087 0.284 0.040 -0.056 0.178 -0.025 1.000
STATE = Percentage of shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square of percentage o f shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE =  Logarithm of total assets
ROA = net income / total assets
Table 6 displays a correlation analysis of the explanatory variable checking for multi- 
collinearity. It appears multi-collinearity is not influencing the regression results. The only high 
correlation coefficient is between STATE and STATE2. This is expected because these two 
variables are derived from each other. STATE2 is the square of STATE which is the percentage 
of state-owned shares. Wei et al. (2005) did test for potential endogeneity of ownership and 
found that Tobin’s Q and state ownership divided by foreign ownership are not jointly 
determined.
47
Heteroscedasticity was checked for by calculating the average of the minimum and 
maximum value of each dependent variable and comparing it to the mean value. Large 
differences between these two metrics indicate heteroscedasticity. All 4 dependent variables have 
heteroscedasticity. See Table 1 for results.
The serial correlation test was performed by reviewing the Durbin-Watson statistic from 
each regression. The test statistic is 2. Durbin-Watson statistics are not close to 2. Therefore, 
there is evidence of serial correlation. See Appendix 4a to 7b for results.
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Chapter V 
Conclusion and Future Research
In China, state governance in corporations serves the purpose of Communist party control 
over the political, social, and economic development and most importantly, stability of the 
country. Therefore, Chinese state owned enterprises have equally important corporate and social 
objectives. The first objective is stock market performance. The second objective is employment. 
Both objectives must be controlled and managed well through the corporate sector in order for 
China to successfully advance its economy and preserve its political order. While the state 
governance relationship with performance of Chinese corporations is well studied, the state 
relationship with employment has little literature. This study hypothesizes that state governance 
will have effects on both market and social performance. The relationships are examined by 
using panel regressions for a large sample of 2,536 Chinese publicly listed firms during 2001- 
2011.
The results affirm a non-linear, concave relationship between state ownership and 
financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. This relationship suggests that private 
governed and highly state-governed firms have lower performance than mixed governed firms. 
Second, results strongly indicate that state governance positively affects employment stability 
and employment numbers after standardized by size. While mixed control firms appear to be 
achieving high market performance, they are poorer in creating new employment. These results 
support the hypothesis of the employment objective of Chinese firms. However, following Xia 
Gang of SOEs in 1997, many SOE employees lost their jobs. Therefore, SOEs have already 
downsized prior to the study sample period (2001 to 2011). This action prior to the study casts 
doubt on the hypothesis of the helping hand.
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Overall, this study concludes that when using the depend variable as number of 
employees divided by assets, mixed control firms benefit the least in social performance, and this 
is opposite with stock market performance. The mixed control firms perform poorly because they 
are more focusing on financial performance. Moreover, they may not receive effective 
governance monitoring as neither private nor state firms have enough ownership to attend to 
social performance, and they face more ambiguity and conflict between firms and state 
objectives of profit maximization versus social maximization.
Sun et al. (2002) indicate that SOE reform has been a top priority for Chinese 
government since early 1990s. All the reforms suggest that government ownership has 
complicated effects on the partially privatized SOEs in China. Therefore, policy change in China 
would have significant impact of both financial and social performance to Chinese firms. Xu and 
Wang (2003) argues that state ownership gives rise to agency conflicts and has a negative impact 
on firm performance in China. In addition, some scholars argue that state owned firms destroy 
shareholder wealth. Once privatized, many people will lose their jobs. Therefore, do SOEs firms 
that are not managed efficiently really contributing to social stability? This is a suggestion for 
future research.
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APPENDIX 1
Background of Chinese SOEs
a. Pre-reform period -  State Industry in the Mao Era
Between the 1950s and late 1970s, Chinese state industry followed the pattern pioneered 
in the Soviet Union. The main focus of them is “keeping wages low and involuntarily procuring 
agricultural products from the peasantry at low prices with the aid of the collectives were key 
elements in the government’s strategy to raise the country’s savings rate from below 10% to 
more than 30%” (Putterman and Dong, 2000).
State extraction from agriculture has been essential in the Soviet Union as well as in 
China. However, collectivization and the nationalization of industry took place in stages during 
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) since Mao was attempting to achieve more rapid industrial 
growth. The consequence of that was “China simply could not afford to follow the Soviet pattern 
of transferring agricultural labour into industry” (Putterman and Dong, 2000).
There are few reasons why the Soviet Union model did not work in China. Firstly, 
technology of industrial was imported from Soviet Union. However, it was highly capital 
intensive rather than labour intensive. Moreover, “the prevailing institutional regime made it far 
more costly to the state to shift a laborer into industry than to leave that laborer in the 
countryside.” (Putterman and Dong, 2000)
Government strategy started to focus on increasing industrial production as rapidly as 
possible while holding urban population growth close to its established rate of natural increase 
by facing the high cost of supporting additional urban workers. “Indeed, even though from 1952 
to 1977, state industrial assets and output grew by some 10.6% and 9.8% per year, respectively, 
SOE employment still did not absorb the available urban labor. The urban collective sector 
consequently was called on to play a supplementary role, creating both additional jobs and less
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capital-intensive goods and services while paying lower wages and providing fewer benefits. The 
SOE and urban COE sectors created 2.4 million and 2.7 million jobs, respectively, during this 
period.” (Putterman and Dong, 2000)
b. Stage 1:1984-1992
The major change was to grant SOEs more autonomy and financial incentives to 
managers. The Chinese government allowed SOEs more autonomy in production plan and profit 
retention by issuing “On Regulations of Further Expanding Autonomy of State-owned 
Enterprises,” in May, 1984, and in January, 1987, the government started promoting “contract 
responsibility system” which allowed managers to share part of the profits that were above what 
was set in their contract with the government (Wang, 2003).
“Contract responsibility system” combined with the “dual-track price system" allowed 
SOEs to sell their products at the market price which can be above the planned quota, and this 
measure gave SOE mangers more financial incentives and improved SOEs’ financial 
performance. “By the end of 1987, about 80% of the large and medium-sized SOEs adopted 
contract responsibility system, and by 1989 almost all SOEs adopted this system.” (Wang, 2003) 
In July, 1992, the State Council issued "Regulations on Transforming the Management 
Mechanism of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises," granting SOEs further rights to set up their 
own prices, wages, hiring and firing, investment of fixed capital and foreign trade, etc., and after 
the regulations were issued, many SOEs began laying off workers in an effort to improve 
financial performance. The regulations gave SOEs more bargaining power to resist government 
interferences. (Wang, 2003)
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c. Stage 2:1993-2002
In early 1992, Deng Xiaopin had his famous speech during his “southern tour,” and he 
pushed for further reform based on a market system. In November, 1993, Chinese government 
provided a package of reform measures to carry out the vision of a “socialist market system” set 
forth by the Fourteenth Congress. The decision set forth the task of transforming SOEs into 
“modem enterprises” with "clarified property rights, clearly defined responsibility and authority, 
separation of enterprises from the government, and scientific internal management.” It also 
allowed for privatization of small and medium-sized SOEs. "As for the small state-owned 
enterprises, the management of some can be contracted out or leased; others can be shifted to the 
partnership system in the form of stock sharing, or sold to collectives and individuals." (Wang, 
2003)
By 1996, over half of the small SOEs were privatized. At the same time, over ten million 
workers were laid off from SOEs. In 1997, the Fifteenth Party Congress further promoted the 
privatization of small SOEs by putting forward the slogan of “grasping the large (SOEs), letting 
go the small (SOEs)”. (Wang, 2003)
d. Stage 3: 2002 -  present
Ownership reform became the focus of SOE reform and shareholding companies were set to 
become the major form of SOEs. For large SOEs, the government established the State-owned 
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in March, 2003. The SASAC is to 
represent the state in performing its duty and exercise its rights as the owner through its 
management of assets, personnel, and operations and they are being set up at provincial level in 
2004. The central government is to manage the large SOEs that are crucial to national security 
and the lifeline of national economy. Other SOEs are to be managed by local governments.
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In October, 2003, the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress issued “Decision 
Concerning Issues of Perfecting Socialist Market Economy System” and the decision made a few 
ideological breakthroughs:
i) For the first time, the Party acknowledged property rights as the “core issue” of ownership
reform and made building “modem system of property rights” its important task of 
future reform.
ii) The Party redefines the public ownership in a socialist economy and made “shareholding
companies” the main organizational form of public ownership. The Party further 
made promotion of “mixed economy” its task.
iii) Private enterprises should be promoted and allowed on equal footings in terms of
financing and taxation as state-owned enterprises.
Corporatization of SOEs has been an important reform measure taken by the government 
since the mid-1990s with the goal of building modem enterprises in a market system. After 
undergoing ownership reform, some of those SOEs went public. With the new ideological 
breakthroughs in 2003, we can expect more SOEs to be turned into shareholding companies. 
Whether they are eventually listed in the stock exchange or not, these “modem corporations” 
will likely follow the governance structure of those listed. (Qian, 1999)
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APPENDIX 2 
State ownership and annual stock return
Appendix 3a and 3b presents panel regression results on the relationship between state 
ownership and annual stock return. Both regressions are highly significant (at the one percent 
alpha level) with F statistics of 66.84 and 1,480.71, and adjusted R-squares are 0.067 and 0.724. 
The results show that STATE has significant (at the one percent alpha level) and a positive effect 
with beta coefficients of 0.89 on stock return performance. State share ownership is positively 
related to financial performance. This result implies that high private control / privatization is not 
beneficial to SOE performance as find with Tobin’s Q. The ST ATE 2 variable is negative with 
beta coefficient of -1.12 and significantly related at the one percent alpha level to annual stock 
return. Based on finding a positive STATE and negative STATE^ relationship, this non-linear 
relationship with stock performance appears to be concave or n-shaped. Such a concave 
relationship implies that high state controlled and highly privatized SOEs are related to lower 
market performance.
ASHARE variable is positive and significant related (at the one percent alpha level) to 
annual stock return with a beta coefficient of 0.32 in random effect (in fixed effect, it is 
significant at the one percent alpha level and beta coefficient is .07). The stock market appears to 
value the effect of private ownership and the benefits of private control over state control. This 
positive effect is not found with Tobin's Q result. The LEGAL variable has significantly (at the 
one percent alpha level) positive (coefficient of 0.33) effects on annual stock return. This 
suggests that institutional ownership confer their inherent benefits of greater economic 
orientation and profit seeking toward their governance role of privatized Chinese firms (Ng et al., 
2009).
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Looking at firm level governance, it appears that EXECUTIVE ownership has highly 
significant (at the one percent alpha level) and negative (coefficient is -0.72) effects on annual 
stock return in random effect. This is consistent with finding of a negative relationship with 
Tobin's Q. The multiple ownership structure of Chinese SOE's can increase agency conflicts and 
incentivize high agency costs of personal and political gain. Tobin's Q results show 
independence of directors (INDDIR) to have significant (at the one percent alpha level) and 
positive effects with beta coefficient of 0.14 on annual stock returns. The benefit of independent 
directors could be their stronger orientation for financial performance.
With firm characteristics, results indicate that return on sales and return on assets both 
have positive and significant (at the one percent alpha level) effects on annual stock return. Beta 
coefficients are 0.30 and 1.46 respectively. These results met the expectations that market returns 
should correlate positively with profitability. Size and leverage variables have no significant 
effects on annual stock return. None of the industry controls except for industrial firms have 
significant (at the five percent alpha level) effects on returns. Overall, state ownership is related 
to both measures of financial performance including Tobin’s Q and stock returns. However, 
there are some differences in the effects of a few variables between these two measures.
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APPENDIX 3a
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Annual Stock Return -  Random effect
Dependent Variable: RETURN 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2010
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 14661
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.307802 0.140192 -2.195581 0.0281
STATE 0.888420 0.111531 7.965642 0.0000
STATE2 -1.115082 0.156501 -7.125102 0.0000
ASHARE 0.322053 0.045071 7.145500 0.0000
LEGAL 0.329756 0.056026 5.885811 0.0000
EXECUT -0.723568 0.150568 -4.805584 0.0000
INDDIR 1.361699 0.076297 17.84742 0.0000
LEVERAGE 0.001186 0.003609 0.328781 0.7423
ROS 0.294993 0.033701 8.753287 0.0000
SIZE -0.010403 0.006342 -1.640290 0.1010
ROA 1.461411 0.078210 18.68581 0.0000
DUAL 0.002581 0.020386 0.126616 0.8992
IND1 0.012699 0.066048 0.192268 0.8475
IND2 0.008834 0.034610 0.255242 0.7985
IND3 0.014235 0.034452 0.413187 0.6795
IND4 -0.002646 0.030207 -0.087612 0.9302
IND5 0.053821 0.026019 2.068476 0.0386
R-squared 0.068059 Mean dependent var 0.253252
Adjusted R-squared 0.067041 S.D. dependent var 0.892861
S.E. of regression 0.862413 Akaike info criterion 2.542994
Sum squared resid 10891.56 Schwarz criterion 2.551798
Log likelihood -18624.41 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.545918
F-statistic 66.83988 Durbin-Watson stat 2.561231
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
RETURN= Annual stock return
S T A T E  =  Percentage o f shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square of percentage o f shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  =  Percentage of shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  =  Percentage o f shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage of independent directors
L E V E R A G E  =  Total debt /  total equity
R O S  =  Net income /  total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm o f total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 3b
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Annual Stock Return -  Fixed effect
Dependent Variable: RETURN 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2010
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 14661
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.301522 0.082355 3.661233 0.0003
STATE -0.044419 0.063034 -0.704682 0.4810
STATE2 0.204448 0.087431 2.338386 0.0194
ASHARE 0.067082 0.026072 2.572989 0.0101
LEGAL 0.116396 0.030813 3.777537 0.0002
EXECUT 0.070963 0.085712 0.827919 0.4077
INDDIR -0.021415 0.065835 -0.325277 0.7450
LEVERAGE 0.003296 0.001964 1.678829 0.0932
ROS 0.199342 0.018443 10.80868 0.0000
SIZE -0.005784 0.003543 -1.632790 0.1025
ROA 0.526012 0.043013 12.22920 0.0000
DUAL -0.003747 0.011104 -0.337492 0.7358
IND1 0.003244 0.035938 0.090258 0.9281
IND2 -0.029151 0.018840 -1.547346 0.1218
IND3 -0.001006 0.018744 -0.053688 0.9572
IND4 -0.018707 0.016433 -1.138386 0.2550
IND5 0.016271 0.014157 1.149317 0.2504
Effects Specification
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.724575 Mean dependent var 0.253252
Adjusted R-squared 0.724086 S.D. dependent var 0.892861
S.E. of regression 0.468998 Akaike info criterion 1.325402
Sum squared resid 3218.877 Schwarz criterion 1.339385
Log likelihood -9688.859 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.330047
F-statistic 1480.712 Durbin-Watson stat 2.293482
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
RETURN= Annual stock return
STATE =  Percentage o f shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square o f  percentage of shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  =  Percentage o f  shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  = Percentage o f shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage o f independent directors
L E V E R A G E  = Total debt /  total equity
R O S  =  Net income /  total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm o f total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 4a
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Tobin’s Q -  Random effect
Dependent Variable: Q 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2294
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 15965
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.121537 0.034846 3.487815 0.0005
STATE 0.044805 0.027701 1.617426 0.1058
STATE2 -0.172609 0.039092 -4.415416 0.0000
ASHARE -0.020379 0.010984 -1.855215 0.0636
LEGAL -0.054192 0.013527 -4.006296 0.0001
EXECUT -0.646334 0.030939 -20.89032 0.0000
INDDIR 0.142465 0.019048 7.479358 0.0000
LEVERAGE 0.026292 0.000928 28.34671 0.0000
ROS -0.385911 0.008643 -44.64927 0.0000
SIZE 0.017808 0.001584 11.24044 0.0000
ROA -0.119208 0.013643 -8.737562 0.0000
DUAL 0.004071 0.004942 0.823692 0.4101
IND1 0.075122 0.016433 4.571501 0.0000
IND2 -0.050027 0.008724 -5.734082 0.0000
IND3 0.070557 0.008796 8.021876 0.0000
IND4 -0.037030 0.007592 -4.877139 0.0000
IND5 -0.039190 0.006566 -5.968269 0.0000
R-squared 0.278074 Mean dependent var 0.494195
Adjusted R-squared 0.277349 S.D. dependent var 0.263081
S.E. of regression 0.223643 Akaike info criterion -0.156471
Sum squared resid 797.6551 Schwarz criterion -0.148295
Log likelihood 1266.031 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.153767
F-statistic 383.9309 Durbin-Watson stat 0.466694
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Q  =  T o b in ’s Q  =  (market value of equity + Book value o f total liabilities)/Book value of total assets
S T A T E  =  Percentage of shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  =  Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  =  Percentage o f shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage o f independent directors
L E V E R A G E  =  Total debt /  total equity
R O S  =  N et income /  total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm of total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 4b
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Tobin’s Q -  Fixed effect
Dependent Variable: Q 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2294
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 15965
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.134426 0.037442 3.590243 0.0003
STATE -0.009376 0.028518 -0.328773 0.7423
STATE2 -0.100754 0.039877 -2.526599 0.0115
ASHARE -0.017351 0.011564 -1.500499 0.1335
LEGAL -0.064068 0.013554 -4.726701 0.0000
EXECUT -0.595516 0.032774 -18.17015 0.0000
INDDIR 0.072115 0.029757 2.423475 0.0154
LEVERAGE 0.026143 0.000925 28.26167 0.0000
ROS -0.385303 0.008661 -44.48771 0.0000
SIZE 0.018492 0.001624 11.38946 0.0000
ROA -0.125846 0.013853 -9.084736 0.0000
DUAL 0.003257 0.004934 0.660116 0.5092
IND1 0.073977 0.016376 4.517268 0.0000
IND2 -0.050740 0.008698 -5.833209 0.0000
IND3 0.070124 0.008768 7.998109 0.0000
IND4 -0.037732 0.007567 -4.986519 0.0000
IND5 -0.039910 0.006545 -6.097839 0.0000
Effects Specification
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.283813 Mean dependent var 0.494195
Adjusted R-squared 0.282645 S.D. dependent var 0.263081
S.E. of regression 0.222822 Akaike info criterion -0.163200
Sum squared resid 791.3137 Schwarz criterion -0.150215
Log likelihood 1329.746 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.158905
F-statistic 242.9216 Durbin-Watson stat 0.463427
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Q  =  T o b in ’s Q  =  (market value o f equity + Book value of total liabilities)/Book value of total assets
S T A T E  =  Percentage o f  shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square of percentage of shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  = Percentage o f  shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  =  Percentage o f shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage of independent directors
L E V E R A G E  =  Total debt /  total equity
R O S  =  Net income / total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm of total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 5a
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Number of Employees -  Random effect
Dependent Variable: EMPLOYEES 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2073
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 14819
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.558073 0.074296 -34.43100 0.0000
STATE 0.289461 0.059417 4.871666 0.0000
STATE2 -0.238874 0.083460 -2.862133 0.0042
ASHARE -0.012799 0.023944 -0.534545 0.5930
LEGAL 0.025994 0.029720 0.874658 0.3818
EXECUT -0.322605 0.075823 -4.254736 0.0000
INDDIR -0.354941 0.040845 -8.689879 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.009478 0.001923 -4.930152 0.0000
ROS -0.343534 0.017964 -19.12302 0.0000
SIZE 0.272202 0.003368 80.82558 0.0000
ROA -0.075716 0.037864 -1.999665 0.0456
DUAL -0.016246 0.010790 -1.505632 0.1322
IND1 -0.368096 0.034766 -10.58797 0.0000
IND2 0.001199 0.018432 0.065074 0.9481
IND3 -0.493347 0.018400 -26.81253 0.0000
IND4 0.014249 0.016093 0.885436 0.3759
IND5 0.127517 0.013860 9.200664 0.0000
R-squared 0.400521 Mean dependent var 3.190165
Adjusted R-squared 0.399873 S.D. dependent var 0.596389
S.E. of regression 0.462010 Akaike info criterion 1.294686
Sum squared resid 3159.535 Schwarz criterion 1.303409
Log likelihood -9575.977 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.297582
F-statistic 618.0903 Durbin-Watson stat 0.494368
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
EMPLOYEES= Logarithm of number of employees
S T A T E  = Percentage o f shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  =  Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  =  Percentage o f shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage o f independent directors
L E V E R A G E  = Total debt /  total equity
R O S  =  Net income /  total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm of total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 5b
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Number of Employees -  Fixed effect
Dependent Variable: EMPLOYEES 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2073
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 14819
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.810901 0.079827 -35.21244 0.0000
STATE 0.229167 0.061538 3.724029 0.0002
STATE2 -0.189795 0.085490 -2.220073 0.0264
ASHARE 0.052910 0.025330 2.088783 0.0367
LEGAL 0.011538 0.029941 0.385371 0.7000
EXECUT -0.140311 0.079711 -1.760236 0.0784
INDDIR -0.064640 0.064292 -1.005414 0.3147
LEVERAGE -0.009823 0.001919 -5.118019 0.0000
ROS -0.335719 0.018038 -18.61145 0.0000
SIZE 0.278324 0.003444 80.80893 0.0000
ROA -0.080961 0.038142 -2.122612 0.0338
DUAL -0.019267 0.010786 -1.786386 0.0741
IND1 -0.375753 0.034699 -10.82887 0.0000
IND2 0.007220 0.018406 0.392250 0.6949
IND3 -0.497485 0.018365 -27.08939 0.0000
IND4 0.011788 0.016061 0.733988 0.4630
IND5 0.130355 0.013834 9.422515 0.0000
Effects Specification
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.403735 Mean dependent var 3.190165
Adjusted R-squared 0.402687 S.D. dependent var 0.596389
S.E. of regression 0.460925 Akaike info criterion 1.290659
Sum squared resid 3142.594 Schwarz criterion 1.304513
Log likelihood -9536.141 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.295259
F-statistic 385.2223 Durbin-Watson stat 0.492584
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
EMPLOYEES= Logarithm of number of employees
S T A T E  =  Percentage of shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square o f percentage o f  shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  =  Percentage o f shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage o f independent directors
L E V E R A G E  =  Total debt /  total equity
R O S  =  Net income /  total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm of total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 6a
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Change of Employees -  Random effect
Dependent Variable: CHANGE 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 1718
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 12769
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.106426 0.170676 -6.482608 0.0000
STATE -0.378093 0.135591 -2.788479 0.0053
STATE2 0.400517 0.191080 2.096062 0.0361
ASHARE 0.063607 0.055529 1.145478 0.2520
LEGAL 0.065817 0.069845 0.942325 0.3460
EXECUT 1.163186 0.219258 5.305096 0.0000
INDDIR 0.449946 0.139219 3.231933 0.0012
LEVERAGE -0.003312 0.004181 -0.792112 0.4283
ROS 0.157238 0.040167 3.914619 0.0001
SIZE 0.054081 0.007467 7.242419 0.0000
ROA 0.095932 0.097021 0.988779 0.3228
DUAL -0.029663 0.024789 -1.196608 0.2315
IND1 0.033795 0.078342 0.431383 0.6662
IND2 -0.021762 0.041234 -0.527778 0.5977
IND3 0.002513 0.040922 0.061420 0.9510
IND4 -0.022124 0.036110 -0.612672 0.5401
IND5 0.006209 0.030999 0.200297 0.8413
R-squared 0.016262 Mean dependent var 0.203974
Adjusted R-squared 0.015028 S.D. dependent var 0.976007
S.E. of regression 0.968645 Akaike info criterion 2.775494
Sum squared resid 11964.87 Schwarz criterion 2.785419
Log likelihood -17703.14 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.778813
F-statistic 13.17516 Durbin-Watson stat 2.456076
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
CHANGE = Annual change of employees
S T A T E  =  Percentage of shares owned by government
S T A T E 2  =  Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government
A S H A R E  =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
L E G A L  = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
E X E C U T  =  Percentage o f  shares owned by executives
IN D D IR  =  Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt / total equity
R O S  =  Net income /  total sales
S IZ E  =  Logarithm of total assets
R O A  =  Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 6b
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Change of Employees -  Fixed effect
Dependent Variable: CHANGE 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 1718
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 12769
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.763605 0.179898 -4.244651 0.0000
STATE -0.049158 0.139822 -0.351578 0.7252
STATE2 0.058971 0.194848 0.302654 0.7622
ASHARE -0.098176 0.058528 -1.677410 0.0935
LEGAL 0.177781 0.070107 2.535850 0.0112
EXECUT 0.974094 0.223070 4.366761 0.0000
INDDIR 0.267753 0.156855 1.707011 0.0878
LEVERAGE -0.002519 0.004141 -0.608343 0.5430
ROS 0.142416 0.040020 3.558603 0.0004
SIZE 0.043313 0.007572 5.720378 0.0000
ROA -0.049010 0.096945 -0.505548 0.6132
DUAL -0.027113 0.024567 -1.103617 0.2698
IND1 0.029286 0.077603 0.377379 0.7059
IND2 -0.043576 0.040882 -1.065893 0.2865
IND3 -0.000280 0.040522 -0.006899 0.9945
IND4 -0.016970 0.035760 -0.474541 0.6351
IND5 -0.002996 0.030713 -0.097563 0.9223
Effects Specification
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.036394 Mean dependent var 0.203974
Adjusted R-squared 0.034503 S.D. dependent var 0.976007
S.E. of regression 0.959021 Akaike info criterion 2.756227
Sum squared resid 11720.02 Schwarz criterion 2.771407
Log likelihood -17571.13 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.761304
F-statistic 19.25117 Durbin-Watson stat 2.478627
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
CHANGE = Annual change of employees
STATE = Percentage o f shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f  shares owned by executives
INDDIR =  Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE = Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 7a
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Employee/Size -  Random effect
Dependent Variable: EMPLOYEE/SIZE 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2073
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 14818
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.304367 0.022494 13.53122 0.0000
STATE -0.089784 0.017986 -4.991872 0.0000
STATE2 0.115183 0.025264 4.559182 0.0000
ASHARE -0.003069 0.007248 -0.423429 0.6720
LEGAL -0.026940 0.008997 -2.994220 0.0028
EXECUT -0.148474 0.022952 -6.468830 0.0000
INDDIR 0.092828 0.012365 7.507480 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.000845 0.000582 -1.451155 0.1468
ROS 0.030208 0.005442 5.550841 0.0000
SIZE -0.007412 0.001020 -7.268560 0.0000
ROA 0.010288 0.011462 0.897601 0.3694
DUAL 0.004806 0.003266 1.471294 0.1412
IND1 0.040307 0.010524 3.830079 0.0001
IND2 0.014224 0.005580 2.549260 0.0108
IND3 0.160153 0.005570 28.75395 0.0000
IND4 0.008159 0.004872 1.674874 0.0940
IND5 0.004349 0.004195 1.036691 0.2999
R-squared 0.097452 Mean dependent var 0.185094
Adjusted R-squared 0.096476 S.D. dependent var 0.147131
S.E. of regression 0.139854 Akaike info criterion -1.095295
Sum squared resid 289.4931 Schwarz criterion -1.086572
Log likelihood 8132.040 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.092399
F-statistic 99.88280 Durbin-Watson stat 0.702984
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
EMPLOYEE/SIZE = Number o f Employees /  Assets
STATE = Percentage o f shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square of percentage of shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income / total sales
SIZE = Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 7b
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Employee/Size -  fixed effect
Dependent Variable: EMPLOYEE/SIZE 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2011
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 2073
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 14818
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.293983 0.024226 12.13522 0.0000
STATE -0.090011 0.018672 -4.820601 0.0000
STATE2 0.116578 0.025940 4.494106 0.0000
ASHARE -0.002899 0.007686 -0.377125 0.7061
LEGAL -0.026530 0.009086 -2.920016 0.0035
EXECUT -0.143088 0.024187 -5.915985 0.0000
INDDIR 0.121708 0.019508 6.238858 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.000833 0.000582 -1.429894 0.1528
ROS 0.029930 0.005477 5.464615 0.0000
SIZE -0.007386 0.001045 -7.065470 0.0000
ROA 0.007758 0.011573 0.670297 0.5027
DUAL 0.005020 0.003273 1.533950 0.1251
IND1 0.039907 0.010529 3.790298 0.0002
IND2 0.014127 0.005585 2.529480 0.0114
IND3 0.159825 0.005572 28.68210 0.0000
IND4 0.007901 0.004873 1.621297 0.1050
IND5 0.004218 0.004198 1.004797 0.3150
Effects Specification
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.098023 Mean dependent var 0.185094
Adjusted R-squared 0.096438 S.D. dependent var 0.147131
S.E. of regression 0.139857 Akaike info criterion -1.094578
Sum squared resid 289.3099 Schwarz criterion -1.080724
Log likelihood 8136.731 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.089979
F-statistic 61.82400 Durbin-Watson stat 0.702750
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
EMPLOYEE/SIZE = Number of Employees /  Assets
STATE = Percentage o f  shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square of percentage o f shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f  shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f  shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE = Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 8
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Tobin’s Q -  Robustness
Dependent Variable: Q 
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1 30430
Included observations: 1S96S after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.121537 0.034846 3.487815 0.0005
STATE 0.044805 0.027701 1.617426 0.1058
STATE2 -0.172609 0.039092 -4.415416 0.0000
ASHARE -0.020379 0.010984 -1.855215 0.0636
LEGAL -0.054192 0.013527 -4.006296 0.0001
EXECUT -0.646334 0.030939 -20.89032 0.0000
INDDIR 0.142465 0.019048 7.479358 0.0000
LEVERAGE 0.026292 0.000928 28.34671 0.0000
ROS -0.385911 0.008643 -44.64927 0.0000
SIZE 0.017808 0.001584 11.24044 0.0000
ROA -0.119208 0.013643 -8.737562 0.0000
DUAL 0.004071 0.004942 0.823692 0.4101
IND1 0.075122 0.016433 4.571501 0.0000
IND2 -0.050027 0.008724 -5.734082 0.0000
IND3 0.070557 0.008796 8.021876 0.0000
IND4 -0.037030 0.007592 -4.877139 0.0000
IND5 -0.039190 0.006566 -5.968269 0.0000
R-squared 0.278074 Mean dependent var 0.494195
Adjusted R-squared 0.277349 S.D. dependent var 0.263081
S.E. of regression 0.223643 Akaike info criterion -0.156471
Sum squared resid 797.6551 Schwarz criterion -0.148295
Log likelihood 1266.031 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.153767
F-statistic 383.9309 Durbin-Watson stat 0.466694
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Q = Tobin’s Q = (market value of equity + Book value o f  total liabilities)/Book value of total assets
STATE = Percentage o f shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square of percentage of shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f  shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE =  Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 9
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Annual Stock Return -  Robustness
Dependent Variable: RETURN 
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1 30430
Included observations: 14661 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.307802 0.140192 -2.195581 0.0281
STATE 0.888420 0.111531 7.965642 0.0000
STATE2 -1.115082 0.156501 -7.125102 0.0000
ASHARE 0.322053 0.045071 7.145500 0.0000
LEGAL 0.329756 0.056026 5.885811 0.0000
EXECUT -0.723568 0.150568 -4.805584 0.0000
INDDIR 1.361699 0.076297 17.84742 0.0000
LEVERAGE 0.001186 0.003609 0.328781 0.7423
ROS 0.294993 0.033701 8.753287 0.0000
SIZE -0.010403 0.006342 -1.640290 0.1010
ROA 1.461411 0.078210 18.68581 0.0000
DUAL 0.002581 0.020386 0.126616 0.8992
IND1 0.012699 0.066048 0.192268 0.8475
IND2 0.008834 0.034610 0.255242 0.7985
IND3 0.014235 0.034452 0.413187 0.6795
IND4 -0.002646 0.030207 -0.087612 0.9302
IND5 0.053821 0.026019 2.068476 0.0386
R-squared 0.068059 Mean dependent var 0.253252
Adjusted R-squared 0.067041 S.D. dependent var 0.892861
S.E. of regression 0.862413 Akaike info criterion 2.542994
Sum squared resid 10891.56 Schwarz criterion 2.551798
Log likelihood -18624.41 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.545918
F-statistic 66.83988 Durbin-Watson stat 2.561231
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
RETURN= Annual stock return
STATE = Percentage of shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square o f percentage o f shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage of shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage o f independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE = Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
APPENDIX 10
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Employees -  Robustness
Dependent Variable: EMLOYEES 
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1 30430
Included observations: 14819 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.558073 0.074296 -34.43100 0.0000
STATE 0.289461 0.059417 4.871666 0.0000
STATE2 -0.238874 0.083460 -2.862133 0.0042
ASHARE -0.012799 0.023944 -0.534545 0.5930
LEGAL 0.025994 0.029720 0.874658 0.3818
EXECUT -0.322605 0.075823 -4.254736 0.0000
INDDIR -0.354941 0.040845 -8.689879 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.009478 0.001923 -4.930152 0.0000
ROS -0.343534 0.017964 -19.12302 0.0000
SIZE 0.272202 0.003368 80.82558 0.0000
ROA -0.075716 0.037864 -1.999665 0.0456
DUAL -0.016246 0.010790 -1.505632 0.1322
IND1 -0.368096 0.034766 -10.58797 0.0000
IND2 0.001199 0.018432 0.065074 0.9481
IND3 -0.493347 0.018400 -26.81253 0.0000
IND4 0.014249 0.016093 0.885436 0.3759
IND5 0.127517 0.013860 9.200664 0.0000
R-squared 0.400521 Mean dependent var 3.190165
Adjusted R-squared 0.399873 S.D. dependent var 0.596389
S.E. of regression 0.462010 Akaike info criterion 1.294686
Sum squared resid 3159.535 Schwarz criterion 1.303409
Log likelihood -9575.977 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.297582
F-statistic 618.0903 Durbin-Watson stat 0.494368
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
EMPLOYEES= Logarithm o f number o f employees
STATE = Percentage of shares owned by government
STATE2 =  Square of percentage of shares owned by government
ASHARE =  Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f  shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f  shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage of independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE =  Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 11
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  Change of Employee -  Robustness
Dependent Variable: CHANGE 
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2 30430
Included observations: 12769 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.106426 0.170676 -6.482608 0.0000
STATE -0.378093 0.135591 -2.788479 0.0053
STATE2 0.400517 0.191080 2.096062 0.0361
ASHARE 0.063607 0.055529 1.145478 0.2520
LEGAL 0.065817 0.069845 0.942325 0.3460
EXECUT 1.163186 0.219258 5.305096 0.0000
INDDIR 0.449946 0.139219 3.231933 0.0012
LEVERAGE -0.003312 0.004181 -0.792112 0.4283
ROS 0.157238 0.040167 3.914619 0.0001
SIZE 0.054081 0.007467 7.242419 0.0000
ROA 0.095932 0.097021 0.988779 0.3228
DUAL -0.029663 0.024789 -1.196608 0.2315
IND1 0.033795 0.078342 0.431383 0.6662
IND2 -0.021762 0.041234 -0.527778 0.5977
IND3 0.002513 0.040922 0.061420 0.9510
IND4 -0.022124 0.036110 -0.612672 0.5401
IND5 0.006209 0.030999 0.200297 0.8413
R-squared 0.016262 Mean dependent var 0.203974
Adjusted R-squared 0.015028 S.D. dependent var 0.976007
S.E. of regression 0.968645 Akaike info criterion 2.775494
Sum squared resid 11964.87 Schwarz criterion 2.785419
Log likelihood -17703.14 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.778813
F-statistic 13.17516 Durbin-Watson stat 2.456076
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
CHANGE = Annual change of employees
STATE = Percentage of shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square of percentage of shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage of shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage o f shares owned by executives
INDDIR = Percentage of independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = Net income /  total sales
SIZE = Logarithm o f total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 12
Eviews 8 regression testing result -  EMPLOYEE/SIZE -  Robustness
Dependent Variable: EMPLOYEE/SIZE 
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1 30430
Included observations: 14818 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.304367 0.022494 13.53122 0.0000
STATE -0.089784 0.017986 -4.991872 0.0000
STATE2 0.115183 0.025264 4.559182 0.0000
ASHARE -0.003069 0.007248 -0.423429 0.6720
LEGAL -0.026940 0.008997 -2.994220 0.0028
EXECUT -0.148474 0.022952 -6.468830 0.0000
INDDIR 0.092828 0.012365 7.507480 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.000845 0.000582 -1.451155 0.1468
ROS 0.030208 0.005442 5.550841 0.0000
SIZE -0.007412 0.001020 -7.268560 0.0000
ROA 0.010288 0.011462 0.897601 0.3694
DUAL 0.004806 0.003266 1.471294 0.1412
IND1 0.040307 0.010524 3.830079 0.0001
IND2 0.014224 0.005580 2.549260 0.0108
IND3 0.160153 0.005570 28.75395 0.0000
IND4 0.008159 0.004872 1.674874 0.0940
IND5 0.004349 0.004195 1.036691 0.2999
R-squared 0.097452 Mean dependent var 0.185094
Adjusted R-squared 0.096476 S.D. dependent var 0.147131
S.E. of regression 0.139854 Akaike info criterion -1.095295
Sum squared resid 289.4931 Schwarz criterion -1.086572
Log likelihood 8132.040 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.092399
F-statistic 99.88280 Durbin-Watson stat 0.702984
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
EM PLOYEE/SIZE -  Number o f Employees /  Assets
STATE = Percentage o f shares owned by government
STATE2 = Square of percentage o f shares owned by government
ASHARE = Ordinary equity shares mostly held and traded by individuals
LEGAL = Percentage o f shares owned by legal institutions
EXECUT = Percentage of shares owned by executives
INDDIR =  Percentage of independent directors
LEVERAGE = Total debt /  total equity
ROS = N et income /  total sales
SIZE =  Logarithm of total assets
ROA = Net income/ total assets
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APPENDIX 13
Hausman Test Results
Regression 1 - Tobin’s Q
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects
Chi-Sq.
Test Summary Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 1126.304301 11 0.0000
Regression 2 -  Number of employees
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Chi-Sq.
Test Summary Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 361.237342 11 0.0000
Regression 3 - Change in number of employees
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Chi-Sq.
Test Summary Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 87.593743 11 0.0000
Regression 4 -  Number of employees divided by total assets
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Chi-Sq.
Test Summary Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 28.238686 11 0.0030
